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CRIMINAL LAW
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL:
THE CASE FOR AN EXANTE
PARITY STANDARD
DONALD A. DRIPPS*
Gideon v. Wainwright,' virtually alone in the field of constitutional criminal procedure, enjoys unqualified support across the
ideological spectrum. 2 Many critics sympathetic to the defense,3

however, have complained that the Court betrayed Gideon's
promise of effective defense counsel in Strickland v. Washington.4
Strickland, which requires a convicted defendant to prove that
defense counsel's unprofessional errors undermined the reli-

* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. This article benefited
enormously from the thoughtful comments of participants at two faculty workshops,
one at the University of Indiana at Bloomington in November 1996, and one at the
University of Illinois in February 1997. Special thanks to Craig Bradley, Joe Hoffman,
Andy Leipold, John Nowak, Kit Kinports, Ron Totunda and Yale Kamisar.
1 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Michael B. Mushlin, Gideon v. Wainwright Revisited: What does the Right to
Counsel Guarantee Today 2, 10 PACE L. REV. 327, 327-28 (1990) ("Two and a half decades later this support [for Gideon] has not diminished. Even former Attorney General Edwin Meese III approves.") (footnotes omitted).
s See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade ofStrickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinaland Practical Underminingof the Right to Counsel 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 91 (1995); Gary
Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal
Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59 (1986); Richard Klein, The EmperorGideon
Has No Clothes: The Empty Promiseof the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel 13 HAmNGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).
'466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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ability of the trial,5 ranks among the most-cited Supreme Court
cases ever decided.
My thesis holds that the Strickland inquiry into counsel's effectiveness ex post should be supplement by an ex ante inquiry
into whether the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as
effectively as the prosecution. Courts could make this determination either in collateral civil proceedings to test the effectiveness of the indigent defense system, or in individual criminal
cases upon a pretrial motion claiming that effective assistance
cannot be rendered in the instant case because of the indigent
defense system's deficiencies.
Stricklands critics rightly claim that the current right-tocounsel doctrine is dysfunctional. The root of the problem,
however, lies in Gideon's focus on the right to counsel to the neglect of the right to afair trial. It is indeed the case that the publicly-funded lawyers who represent most criminal defendants are
overworked, underpaid, and all too often either inexperienced
or burnt out. It is indeed the case that the Strickland test has
failed to improve the defense function. It is indeed the case
that effective defense representation is the single most important of our system's safeguards against convicting people of
crimes they had nothing to do with or of more serious offenses
than they actually committed. And it is indeed the case that
there is no prospect of legislative action to improve the situation.
The courts should broaden their focus to concentrate on
the fairness of the proceedings rather than the absence of identifiable errors by defense counsel. The key obstacle to reform
lies in Strickland's inquiry into the effectiveness of counsel after
the fact. It is all but ludicrous to ask a reviewing court to assess a
record made by counsel to determine how counsel erred. As
one might expect, this inquiry has done little to improve the
quality of defense representation. The theoretical availability of

5Id. at 687.
6

As of October 31, 1996, there were 12,241 cases containing the term "Strickland

v. Washington." Search of WESTLAW, ALLSTATES database (Oct. 31, 1996). The
database does not include federal cases.
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relief nonetheless undermines the finality of criminal proceedings.
The better approach would ask before proceedings commence whether the defendant's lawyer can effectively represent
him. Because the effectiveness of counsel is relative to the opposition, the test should be whether the defendant is represented by a lawyer roughly as good and roughly as well-prepared
as counsel for the prosecution. Judges could make this determination either when counsel first enters an appearance for the
accused, or in a collateral civil proceeding to test the adequacy
of ajurisdiction's system of indigent defense.
The article proceeds through six stages. First, it documents
the shortcomings of the indigent defense function in the
United States. Second, it explains the poor state of indigent defense by reference to public choice theory: rational legislatures
have every political incentive to shortchange indigent defense.
The chronic shortage of resources imposes perverse incentives
on defense lawyers. Third, the article defends the normative
judgment that undersupport of the defense function is unjustifiable. This is despite the fact that elected legislatures permit it
to continue and despite the fact that poor people generally
need many other things more desperately than they need legal
services.
Fourth, the article traces the history of right-to-counsel doctrine, a history that helps to explain why the choice of an ex post
approach virtually dictated Stricklands demanding standard.
Fifth, the article develops a critique of ex post approaches in
general, and of Strickland v. Washingtonin particular.
Sixth and finally, the article offers the ex ante parity standard
as a promising alternative to the current regime. Jurisdictions
could comply with the parity standard by improving the staffing,
increasing the compensation, and expanding the support services of indigent defense lawyers working in traditional public
defender, contract, or appointment systems. They could also
comply by integrating the functions of prosecution and defense.
However it happened, progress toward parity would occur incrementally, and with the support, rather than over the opposition, of legislatures. The parity standard, then, is not a panacea,
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but it does offer a real prospect of reforming indigent defense
through constitutional doctrine.
I. DESCRIPTION: THE PERMANENT CRISIS
Institutional defense of the indigent confronts a cluster of
daunting challenges. Caseloads are enormous, funds are scarce,
and the prestige of the work is low. Success is less common than
failure and often tinged with moral ambiguity. Hence it is difficult to attract highly-qualified lawyers in the first instance. The
pressure of case loads and the cynicism that attends whittling
down the sentences of guilty clients make it just as hard to retain as to recruit qualified personnel.
Just a few years after Gideon, the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice described these
problems in its landmark report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society. The President's Commission noted that:
The shortage of criminal lawyers, which is already severe, is likely to
become more acute in the immediate future. Some of the reasons for
this shortage can be found in the very nature of criminal law practice,
with its generally meager economic rewards and limited security. Most
criminal defendants can pay only a small fee, if any, and only the organized or professional criminal can provide the steady business of a prosperous civil clientele. Counsel for the defense must expect to lose more
cases than he wins, not for any reason related to his legal capabilities but
because, as a matter of statistics, most defendants whose cases are not
dropped early in the process are in fact found guilty....
All but the most eminent criminal lawyers are bound to spend much
of their working lives in overcrowded, physically unpleasant courts, dealing with people who have committed questionable acts, and attempting
to put the best possible construction on those acts. It is not the sort of
working environment that most people choose. Finally, the professional
status of the criminal lawyer tends to be low.8

"Defenders," the Commission observed, "are usually paid less
than prosecutors, and many prosecutors are badly paid."9 Every
7 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME INA FREE SOCIETY 370-74 (1968) [hereinafter THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME].
8
1d. at 371.

9 Id. at 373. Indeed, one measure of the state of the defense function in the immediate aftermath of Gideon can be gleaned from Gideon itself. The State of Alabama
argued in its brief that the defense bar was so bad that typical defendants were really
better off without such advocates:
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succeeding survey of the defense function has noticed the same
problems. The defense function in the United States is in a
permanent state of crisis. 10
In 1973, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
published a study based on site inspections around the country
and on questionnaires to judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. The study concluded:
[T] he resources allocated to indigent defense services have been found
grossly deficient in light of the needs of adequate and effective representation. Relatively few indigent defendants have the benefit of investigation and other expert assistance in their defense. Their advocates are
overburdened, undertrained, and underpaid, and as recent studies have
shown, the poor have as little confidence in such advocates, who are often hand-picked by the same authority which pronounces their sentence,
as they do in the inherent fairness of the American criminal justice system.

That same year, David Bazelon, the distinguished Chief
Judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, published a lecture entitled, The Defective Assistance of Counsel.1 2 The judge opined that "a great many-if not mostindigent defendants do not receive the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment. 13

He

continued, "I have often been told that if my court were to
reverse every case in which there was inadequate counsel, we
would have to send back half the convictions in my
jurisdiction. ' ' 4 Bazelon'sjaundiced view may have been too
Many observers of the criminal trial scene are of the opinion that today only a

few lawyers who undertake criminal defense cases are equal matches for career
prosecutors whose intimate familiarity with a wide variety of criminal charges and

prosecution techniques makes them formidable adversaries.
This demonstrates that, generally speaking, indigent persons charged with crime
are not as unfortunately situated as critics of the Betts v. Brady rule would have us
believe.
Brief for Amicus Curiae State of Alabama at 10, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (No. 155).
10 Or, in the title of a recent article, "The Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic." See
Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis is Chronic, 9
CRiM.JUST. 13, 13 (1994).
" NORMAN LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR TIE POOR 14 (1982) (quoting
NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 70
(1973)).
1 David Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counse, 42
U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1973).
"Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
4
I at 22-23.
id.
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dour, but it may not be attributed to judicial philosophy. Warren Burger pretty much agreed with Bazelon's assessment."5
In 1982, Professor Norman Lefstein prepared a report for
the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants. 6 He reviewed thirty-seven studies
of indigent defense systems.1 He summarized their findings as
follows:
Most of these studies were undertaken by consultants from outside the
jurisdiction evaluated, and in virtually every instance the adequacy of
funding, and the overall sufficiency of resources and defense services
were principal concerns. Sixteen of the studies involved the total state
system for providing defense services, whereas the balance focused on
one or several counties in the state. Altogether the summaries in Appendix F contain data on all or part of twenty-four states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Taken as a whole, these evaluations of defense programs, consisting of more than 4,000 pages of reports, present
an exceedingly depressing picture of insufficient defense financing. Regardless of whether the study was conducted by NLADA, a private research organization, a bar association, or some other group, the message
was the same: more funds are desperately needed to hire more lawyers
private
and support staff, to reduce excessive caseloads, to compensate
other needs..
lawyers adequately, and to provide for a host of

Lefstein also relied on five new site inspections. These "vividly
illustrate [d] the financial difficulties of defense programs."'19
During the 1980s, the country grew more conservative, with
two negative consequences for indigent defense. First, tough"Burger noted that:
Whatever the legal issues or claims, the indispensable element in the trial of a
case is a minimaly adequate advocate for each litigant. Many judges in general
jurisdiction trial courts have stated to me that fewer than 25 percent of the lawyers appearing before them are genuinely qualified; otherjudges go as high as 75
percent I draw this from conversations extending over the past twelve to fifteen
years at judicial meetings and seminars, with literally hundreds ofjudges and experienced lawyers. It would be safer to pick a middle ground and accept as a
working hypothesis that from one-third to one-half of the lawyers who appear in
the serious cases are not really qualified to render fully adequate representation.
The trial of a serious case, whether for damages or for infringement of civil
rights, or for a criminal felony, calls for the kind of special skills and experience
that insurance companies, for example, seek out to defend damage claims.
Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Trainingand Certification
of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 234 (1973)

(footnotes omitted).
"LEEsm , supra note
17See id. at F-1 to F-68.

11.

"' Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
9Id. at 16.
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on-crime policies contributed to expanding caseloads. Second,
the change in the zeitgeist reduced the number of gifted young
lawyers who perceived indigent defense as a political obligation.
Not surprisingly, the indigent defense function did not noticeably improve.
In 1988, the Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a
Free Society, appointed by the American Bar Association, published a report called CriminalJustice in Crisis. 20 The Committee

found:
In short, there is ample evidence that the quality of representation, particularly for the poor, is not what it should be. Not only are we, as a society, depriving the system of the funds necessary to ensure adequate
defense services, the private civil bar is not meeting its responsibility of
involvement in the criminal justice process. The criminal justice system
is shunned by the mainstream bar, and it will never be able to attract
funds and public
2 1 support if it cannot even garner the respect and support of the bar.

A 1989 study of New York City found that indigent defenders
miss over 40% of required court appearances, requiring appointment of substitute counsel; that few pretrial motions are
made; and that defense attorneys view pleading cases as a goal
of the system. 22
In 1993, Richard Klein and Robert Spangenberg-two of
the nation's leading experts on indigent defense, if not the two
leading experts-prepared a report for the American Bar Association's Section of CriminalJustice. 5 They concluded:
The long-term neglect and underfunding of indigent defense has created a crisis of extraordinary proportions in many states throughout the
country. For defendants who enter the criminal justice system, Constitutional protections may be guaranteed only to those who can afford to pay
for them. Justice often does not reach impoverished urban centers or
poor rural counties where limited funding for indigent defense cannot
24
provide effective representation to those accused of crimes.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
2

SPECIAL COMM. ON

liuM. JuST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS

(1988) [hereinafter

CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CRIsIS].
2

Id. at 37.

2MICHAEL McCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIsRsIY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN

NEw YORK Crry (Occasional Papers from the N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Research in Crime
andJustice, No. VI, 1989).
RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993).

24Id. at

25.
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Also in 1993, The American Lawyer published an extensive
survey of indigent defense. The general picture was a familiar
one: underfunding, morale problems, and frequent incompetence. Despite some success stories, indigent defense is plagued
by "serious problems that should disturb the conscience of every
American concerned about equal justice."5
Charles Ogletree, a former public defender and now a Harvard professor, holds that "the typical public defender is burdened by a dramatic lack of resources, limited training and
supervision, an unconscionable caseload, unhealthy working
conditions, and unsympathetic police, prosecutors, judges, witnesses, and jurors with whom she must work., 26 Gary Goodpaster asserts that "while we do not know the incidence of trial
attorney incompetence, impressionistic information indicates it
may be a serious systemic problem., 27 Professors Schulhofer
and Friedman opine that "the results of existing indigent defense methods are often abysmal and.., the need for effective
reform is acute. 2 8 In Georgia, the test of ineffective assistance
of counsel is said to be whether counsel can fog a mirror.2
The shortcomings of indigent defense counsel are most
pronounced in the setting in which the defense function is vital.
Death penalty cases consume enormous amounts of time on
the part of defense counsel, mental health experts, and private
investigators. The defendants are, often understandably, despised. Neither legislators nor courts are willing to pay very
much for the defense of these cases. Consequently, trial coun-

Andy Court, Is There a Crisis?, AM. LAWYER, Jan./Feb. 1993, at 45, 47.
GCharlesJ. Ogletree,Jr., An Essay on the New PublicDefenderfor the 21st Century, LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 81, 85 (footnotes omitted).
'7 Goodpaster, supranote 3, at 73.
"StephenJ. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, RethinkingIndigentDefense: Promoting
Effective Representation Through ConsumerSovereignty andFreedom of Choice ForAll Criminal
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM.L. REv. 73,74-75 (1993).
Stephen B. Bright et al., Keeping Gideon FromBeing Blown Away, CRIM.JUST., Win-

ter 1990, at 10-11 ("The vice-president of the Georgia Trial Lawyers Association once
described the standard for competence of counsel in many Georgia counties as the
'mirror test.' 'You put a mirror under the court-appointed attorney's nose, and if the
mirror clouds up, that's adequate counsel."').
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sel in capital cases are often shockingly unqualified, unprepared, and unsupported. °
The principal support for the claim that indigent defense
generally functions effectively is a study by the National Center
for State Courts. 31 The authors compared the outcomes of cases
in nine different courts according to representation by private
counsel or by a public defender or an assigned lawyer. Although they found that defendants represented by private
counsel fared better than the rest, the differences were not catastrophic.
Bear in mind three points about the Hanson research.
First, there certainly appear to be many jurisdictions not studied
by the Hanson group in which the defense function is grossly
deficient. Second, the Hanson data indeed suggest that private
representation has some benefits. In five large systems with
public defender offices, defendants represented by publicly appointed counsel were incarcerated 71.5% of the time; those
represented by private counsel were incarcerated only 50.5% of
the time, although, in the smaller courts, the difference was
negligible.32 There may be problems with both the size, and the
selection, of the sample, but such inferences as can be drawn
from the study cast no great credit on public defenders.
Finally, and most importantly, it needs to be recalled that
most criminal defendants are poor, even if they are not indigent. Many of those who can afford counsel can still afford only
the services of the bar's bottom-feeders.33 Thus, a comparison
'0 See TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS, ABA CRIM. JUST. SEC.,
TOWARD A MORE JuST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES
48-60 (1990); Douglas W. Vick, PoorhouseJustice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services
and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329 (1995); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV.
323, 324-29; Anthony Paduano & Clive A. Stafford Smith, The Unconscionability of SubMinimum Wages PaidAppointed Counsel in CapitalCases, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 281 (1991);
Yale Kamisar, Gideon v. Wainwright: A QuarterCentury Later, 10 PACE L. REV. 343, 36067 (1990); Ronald Tabak, Gideon v. Wainwright in Death Penalty Cases, 10 PACE L. REV.
407 (1990).
s1 ROGER HANSON ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENDERS GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL

(1992).
12See id. at 59.
" As one report noted:
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between appointed counsel and retained counsel is not necessarily a comparison between appointed counsel and effective
counsel 4
The proposition that indigent defense generally does not attract the most qualified lawyers does not deny that many terrific
lawyers do indigent defense work. The proposition that indigent defense generally is inadequately supported does not mean
that no indigent defendants enjoy the services of a full-time lawyer, publicly paid expert witnesses, and private investigators.
The general propositions, however, remain valid despite these
important qualifications.
Regarding indigent defense, the situation remains grim
more than thirty years after Gideon v. Wainwright. I turn now to
consider the institutional determinants of the problem.
II. EXPLANATION: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

The literature suggests two basic causes for the shortcomings of indigent defense. First, the resources provided for it are

[I] n nearly every large city a private defense bar of low legal and dubious ethical
quality can be found. Few in number, these lawyers typically carry large
caseloads and in many cities dominate the practice in routine cases. They frequent courthouse corridors, bondsmen's offices, and police stations for clients,
and rely not on legal knowledge but on their capacity to manipulate the system.
Their low repute often accurately reflects the quality of the services they render..
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 7, at 371. See alsoJAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE
CONTOuRS OF JUsTICE: COMMUNITmS AND THEM COURTS 289 (1988) ("Privately retained attorneys, most of whose clients are not very wealthy, also rarely provide a
zealous defense.").
' As Feeney andJackson note:
The studies to date clearly do not establish ... that all attorneys lack effect. The
record compiled by the top criminal defense attorneys clearly indicates to the
contrary. The best lawyers do make a difference. Wealthy defendants, or those
who have access to these superior forms of counsel, are likely to fare better in the
criminal courts than those who lack this advantage. Only a few of the defendants
who retain their own criminal defense counsel, however, fall into this group.
Most criminal defendants who hire their own counsel or who have private counsel appointed for them are poor, and only marginally different, if at all, from the
public defender's clients.
Floyd Feeney & Patrick G. Jackson, PublicDefenders, Assigned Counse, Retained Counsel:
Does the Type of CriminalDefense Counsel Matter?, 22 RuTGERS LJ. 361, 409-10 (1991)
(footnotes omitted).
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simply inadequate. 5 The criminal justice system generally is
underfunded. Legislatures, responding to voters fearful of
crime, have no incentive to devote scarce resources to the de36
fense function rather than to additional police or prison space.
Public choice theory clearly predicts what scholars have consistently observed: the defense function is starved for resources.
The second fundamental problem with indigent defense is
ethics
one of conflicting performance incentives. Professional
• 37
and personal pride encourage zealous representation. There
are however, two countervailing incentives. Begin with what we
might call the horizontal conflict of interest, a conflict directly
connected to the public choice problem. Resource constraints
require indigent defenders to engage in the legal equivalent of
triage. If it is impossible to interview the witnesses in every case,
let alone try every case, the institutional defense lawyer must decide which cases deserve the acutely limited resources at hand.
This, in effect, requires the defense lawyer to betray some clients in the interests of others.
If the defendants were spending their own money and had
plenty of it, plea bargaining would still occur. Insurance companies settle cases all the time. When the client bears the costs
of litigation, and reaps the benefits of compromise, it is at least
plausible to believe in the rationality of settlement. When one
adversary pays another's counsel, however, it becomes impossible to replicate the incentives facing litigants who pay their own
way.
If the state guaranteed the costs of a well-prepared defense
at trial to every defendant, and offered no concessions to defendants who plead guilty, defendants naturally would opt for
trial. The costs of trial would be subsidized by the state.
Somehow or other, plea bargaining and public payment of
defense counsel must be accommodated. They can be accomSee, e.g., cGIMINALJUSTIcE IN CRisis, supra note 20, at 41-44; Klein, supra note 3, at
675-76.
6 For a more general account, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Mhy Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the
Rights of the Accused, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993). See, e.g., Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 28, at 87, 91.
"' See, e.g., Schulhofer & Friedman, supranote 28, at 87, 91.
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modated only if someone decides what few defendants will have
their cases investigated and tried. Indigent defendants, unlike
privately-paying litigants, cannot make this decision rationally
because the costs of litigation are, so far as defendants are concerned, external. The current system relies on defense counsel
to make these triage decisions. Technically, the decision to
plead belongs to the client, not the lawyer. Practically, however,
typical defendants are in no position to override pressure from
counsel. Clients who are slated for a speedy plea may well wonder whether they have received the zealous representation to
which they are theoretically entitled.
The second incentive problem might be called the vertical
conflict of interest. A lawyer paid by the government to litigate
against the government must account for the possibility that
8
Somesuccess may cut off the flow of government funding."
times this prospect is implicit, but it can sometimes be quite
crude. Public defenders have lost their positions for trying too
many cases or otherwise litigating too vigorously on behalf of
their putative clients. 9
The vertical conflict is obvious to defendants. 40 This makes
it difficult for counsel to obtain the full confidence of the client,
which in turn impairs both lawyer morale and candid attorneyclient communication. In a nutshell, society asks indigent defense lawyers to silence, more often than to assert, claims of

See, e.g., id. at 84-85.
PROBS. 1, 2-3 (1995).
"SeeRobinson 0. Everett, Foreword,58 LAw & CoNnM-.
41 See, e.g., Schulhofer & Friedman, supranote 28, at 86 ("Indigents commonly mistrust the public defender assigned to them and view him as part of the same court bureaucracy that is 'processing' and convicting them. The lack of trust is a major
obstacle to establishing an effective attorney-client relationship."). As Ogletree observes:
[Public defenders] are paid ... from the same coffers that pay these other court

agents, their offices are occasionally housed in the courthouse itself, and they often make deals with prosecutors that send clients to jail. While attorneys tend to
realize the necessity of such arrangements, clients many times do not. As a result, they accuse their public defenders of being too integrally involved in the
criminal justice system, misidentifying them as players in a nefarious "confidence
game."

Ogletree, supra note 26, at 87 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional rights, and is well-positioned to get that message
across to the stubborn or the thickheaded lawyer.
These problems inhere in institutional defense work regardless of its organizational structure. Legislatures have no more
sympathy for defense services rendered by a public defender's
office than for those rendered by contract lawyers or lawyers
working on appointment. No matter how the government
compensates defense counsel, some politically accountable official must decide how much to appropriate for an office,
whether to renew a contract, or whether to continue an appointment.
So long as democratic politics fail to secure even minimally
adequate funds for indigent defense, no system of representation can avoid the horizontal conflict. In a public defender's office, the lawyers have an incentive to minimize the labor spent
on any given case, for the office's budget will not increase with
an increase in caseload or in the percentage of cases tried.
Since additional cases generate no marginal revenue, there is
no financial incentive to the office to investigate cases thoroughly or to try them. To the extent that the lawyers are working to capacity rather than malingering, investigating or trying
one client's case means not investigating or not trying another's.
The same incentives apply when the courts contract out defense work to private attorneys. A lawyer who receives a lump
sum to represent indigent defendants will receive no more if the
caseload is larger than anticipated. Nor will the payment increase if an unexpectedly high percentage of cases are tried.
Unless the contract is unduly generous, the contract lawyer, like
the public defender, must prioritize the interests of clients, each
of whom theoretically enjoys the counsel's independent loyalty.
Common experience and public choice analysis agree: the contract will not be unduly generous.
Defense lawyers representing indigent clients by appointment, who bill the court for services rendered, theoretically
have an incentive to overinvestigate and overlitigate, because
the costs of representation fall on the court rather than on the
client. Typically, however, the schedule of compensation does
not cover the cost of legal services. In effect, an appointment
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system asks (or forces) private lawyers into taxing their paying
clients to support indigent defense.
Here the horizontal conflict is not among a pool of indigent
defendants, but between the pool of paying and nonpaying clients. It doesn't take a Nobel laureate in economics to figure out
that the rational and self-interested attorney will slight the representation of the nonpaying clients. If the lawyer is not rational or not self-interested, her rational and self-interested
paying clients will find another lawyer who fits the description of
homo economicus.
A voucher system, such as that proposed by professors
Schulhofer and Freidman, 1 faces problems analogous to the
appointment system. Giving the indigent client the appointment power would surely represent an important step to combat
the vertical conflict. But so long as the "reward" for effective defense of indigent clients is more indigent clients, the compensation paid for the work must exceed the costs of performing it. It
will not, unless some way to overcome the public choice hurdle
is found first.
Imagine a voucher system that paid defense lawyers less
than the cost of service. Lawyers would do their best (or their
worst) to avoid becoming a favorite of indigent defendants. Unless nonfinancial returns attend representing indigent defendants, such as trial experience for novices or publicity for
veterans, lawyers would do everything they can to avoid the
criminal practice. The nonfinancial returns to indigent defense
are not now anywhere near enough to overcome the financial
deficit that political neglect has forced on public defender, contract, and appointment systems.
If vouchers were worth only a pro rata share of an inadequate budget, a voucher system would simply privatize the public defender model. Defense lawyers would have to represent a
large number of clients to accumulate the resources needed to
try one case. No doubt some private sector efficiencies would
accrue, with the result that the private defender would be able
to try more cases per thousand than the public defender. But it
4'

See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 28, at 112-22.
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would still be a very small fraction, small enough to force counsel into the same sort of triage that prevails now.
If vouchers were simply a portable appointment-entitling
counsel to bill the court at an hourly rate set by the court-the
public choice problem virtually ensures that the hourly rate
would not cover the cost of services. Lawyers could accept the
voucher only by internalizing the deficit or passing it through to
paying clients. They would face strong incentives to perform as
little service as possible, for though indigent defendants under a
voucher plan would be paying customers, they would be paying
less than the cost of services.
Professors Schulhofer and Friedman hope that legislatures
could be cozened into increasing resources by pasting conservative buzz-words onto proposals for more money.42 They posit
that as defendants opted for the more expensive and more vigorous services of private counsel, legislatures would respond by
preserving the competitiveness of defender offices and/or by
paying what was charged by the private bar.3 Surely this is politically counterfactual. No voucher system would allow the
beneficiary to spend limitless amounts of public money. Rather,
rate schedules would be set just as they are now set for appointed counsel-at levels below the cost of providing legal services. Private firms, perhaps organized along the lines of those
that prosecute worker's compensation's claims, might well improve on the performance of current indigent defense. Market
incentives might spur labor-saving innovations. But the successful firms in such an environment would greatly resemble public
defender offices-providing services to a large number of clients, of whom only a small minority can possibly enjoy a welldefended trial.

12

The authors speak of "deregulation" to "empower" the indigent defendant. See

id. at 102-03.
4'Id. at 104.

"As Professor Schulhofer has acknowledged, in jurisdictions that resort to involuntary appointment, "services are compensated at rates that are invariably far below
their market value, as is obvious from the fact that defense attorneys are not willing to
serve voluntarily." Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ.
1979, 1989 (1992).
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In short, the Schulhofer/Friedman approach responds only
to the vertical conflict problem. If the major cause of defense
inadequacy were pressure from cost-conscious court administrators, their approach makes sense. The predominant challenge,
however, is legislative rather than judicial. If a voucher plan
foreseeably results in major infusions of public funds for criminal defense, it will not be adopted. If it did not result in such an
infusion, it would do only modest good. The best lawyer in
town cannot defend a case for thirty dollars an hour; nobody
can. 45 Lawyers who try will either soon give up criminal practice
or deal with a huge caseload by favoring some clients at the expense of others.

III. EVALUATION: EFFCTVE ASSISTANCE AND THE
PRIORITY OF A FAIR TRIAL

Supporters of democratic institutions typically assume that
accountable legislatures are the best institutions for allocating
priorities among the various possible uses of public funds. 46 Af-

ter all, we want public funds to be spent on behalf of majority
interests. Indeed, we are usually disturbed when concentrated
minority interests prevail over diffuse majority interests, winning
subsidies for mohair or protective tariffs for shoes. Why does
criminal defense deserve priority over other worthy projects,
and why should this question be answered by constitutional
courts rather than by democratically-elected legislatures?
Lawyers generally, and criminal lawyers in particular, may
have trouble taking the first question seriously. The first question, however, is by no means trivial. A deeply egalitarian legislator might well prefer to devote scarce resources to improving
education, health care, or transportation for the poor, rather
than to indigent defense. Are not most of the accused guilty, eiThe $30 figure is not hypothetical. See KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 23, at 6
(In Knox Country, Kentucky, hourly rates were cut from $20 per-hour for out-of-court
and $30 per-hour for in-court time; Virginia caps compensation at $350 for most
felonies).
46 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library
ed., 1937) ("The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse... ").
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ther of the crime charged or of something else equally serious?
Why waste precious dollars on testing the government's (usually
valid) case against (almost invariably) not very nice people? Indigent defense is not a benefits program for defendants. If it
were, many defendants anticipating conviction regardless of the
vigor of the defense might prefer the cash value of the legal
services they might otherwise receive and represent themselves.
That possibility-that the government might, in effect, pay a
bounty for the commission of crimes-makes graphically clear
that appointed counsel is more than an income transfer.
Instead, effective indigent defense is an essential component of the law enforcement system in a free society. Most of
those who have thought about criminal law accept the view that
the right to a fair trial has priority over competing consequentialist considerations, however weighty those considerations
might be. For example, it is usually agreed that mollifying a
vengeful mob with a show-trial of an innocent is wrong, even if
the show-trial is the only way to prevent a deadly riot. This conclusion can be reached from broadly utilitarian 47 as well as from
deontological 8 premises. For present purposes the important
point is that the pursuit of the goal of punishing the guilty is
generally agreed to be subordinate to a side-constraint requiring
a fair trial before punishment.
Thus the indigent defense lawyer represents the client, but
the state subsidizes the representation to place a necessary
check on a necessary system. The question is not what priority
indigent defense deserves versus public education or public
health. Rather, the question is, given the priority of the criminal justice system relative to such other responsibilities as education and public health, what kind of indigent defense
arrangement is minimally sufficient to ensure the fairness of
criminal proceedings?

7

.M. HARE,

RESPONSIBILriy

162 (1981); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
SeeJohn Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHILA. REv. 3, 7-8

MORAL THINKING

22 (1968).

(1955).
" See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES

125-32 (1970).
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49

Gideon quite convincingly connects effective defense counsel and the fairness of the trial. Indeed, Gideon's acquittal at
retrial is a classic illustration of the connection.5 Effective defense representation is essential to a fair trial. If we are going to
dispense with effective counsel on grounds of expense, we
might as well go whole hog and save what is spent on judges,
bailiffs and court reporters. The transition from arrest to prison
would be quicker and cheaper, and only a little less certain.
No one seriously supports saving what is spent on judges because other public responsibilities cry out for funds. Society has
to enforce the criminal law, and it dares not leave this responsibility to unchecked executive discretion. If, as Gideon suggests,
counsel is as essential to due process as the court itself, the
normative case for diverting scarce resources to indigent defense derives from society's willingness to divert resources to law
enforcement.
People who work in the criminal justice system have great
confidence in its safeguards. In a recent study by C. Ronald
Huff, Arye Rattner, and Edward Sagarin, a survey of judges and
criminal lawyers (of whom only a small minority were defense
lawyers) showed that the respondents generally estimated the
false conviction rate at 1% or lower. 51 The generally complacent
view about the system's potential for convicting the innocent,
however, should be profoundly shaken by experience with DNA
testing. Post-conviction testing has conclusively exonerated
many defendants judged guilty by the system. A recent Department ofJustice study reviewed twenty-eight such cases.52
Twenty-eight cases is a vanishingly small number in a system
that incarcerates a million people at any one time.5 But cases in
which the system convicts, yet dedicated advocates of the defen' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
' For the story, see ANTHONYLEwis, GIDEON'S TRU MTET 223-38 (1964).

-1C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONviCrED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 60-61 (1996).
52 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE

STUDIES IN TBE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996).
On the size of the prison population, see, e.g., James . Brown, Note, DrugDi-

version Courts:Are They Needed and Will They Succeed in Breaking the Cycle ofDrug Related
Crime?, 23 N.E.J. CRM. & Crv. CONFINEmENT 63, 76 (1997).
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dant's cause continue to search for exonerating evidence, are
very rare. The Department ofJustice study contains a far more
revealing, and far more disturbing, statistic. The authors surveyed DNA research labs about the tests they had run thus far:
In about 23% of the 21,621 cases, DNA test results excluded suspects, according to respondents. An additional 16 percent of the cases, approximately, yielded inconclusive results, often because the test samples
had deteriorated or were too small. Inconclusive results aside, test resuits in the balance of cases did not exclude the suspect.54

This is a large sample of contemporary cases. Given the expense of a DNA test, law enforcement agencies have a strong incentive not to test people other than very serious targets. What
the DOJ statistics seem to suggest is that for every two or three
prime suspects inculpated by DNA testing, one prime suspect is
exculpated.55
What about cases in which there is no DNA evidence?
There is little reason to think that the police batting average will
be higher in robbery or burglary cases than in rape and homicide cases. Sometimes the perpetrator is apprehended in flagrante, and sometimes there is physical evidence, such as
robbery booty. The police sometimes have similar success in
rape and homicide cases, although perhaps less frequently. In
property cases, as in crimes against persons cases, however, the
police begin with a list of usual suspects and look for one who
fits. If the fit is established by eyewitness testimony, there is
great reason for caution. But further investigation is unlikely to
be done by the police who think they have their case. Neither is
it likely to be done by a public defender managing three hundred felony files. In these cases, the DNA statistics go far to discredit the conventional complacence. In the absence of the
DNA evidence, how many of the suspects tested by the labs
would have either pleaded out or been convicted after trial?
Innocent people in our system are hard to convict; given experienced and well-prepared counsel, the challenge is made far
greater. A common denominator running through the unjust
CONNORS ETAL., supranote 52, at 20.
s See id. at 20 n.* ("If inconclusive cases were omitted, the exclusion rate for the
FBI would be approximately 25 percent, and the average exclusion rate for the other
18 laboratories would be about 30 percent.").
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conviction cases is a shoddy defense at trial. As Huff et al. note,
"That some people are convicted because their lawyers have little experience, caseloads that are too large, and inadequate
budgets to carry out excellent investigations is evident. 56,
Forming an estimate of the false conviction rate based on
the DNA lab results would require assumptions about whether
innocent people are likely to plead guilty in the face of strong
incriminating evidence. It would further require estimating the
success of the trial process in acquitting innocent defendants
who go to trial. That is work for another paper. What seems
clear from the DNA lab tests, however, is that the notion that
"they're all guilty, so what does it matter?" greatly overstates the
reliability of police investigations.
Misidentification is the leading cause of unjust convictions.
Official misconduct, dishonest informants, and false confessions
play a role. A single reform, however, would do more than any
other plausible policy to reduce the frequency of false convictions. That reform is making sure that every defendant has the
effective assistance of counsel.
The dubious belief that trials do not matter because police
investigation and prosecutorial screening weed out all but the
guilty is a rationalization for the neglect of indigent defense, not
the cause. There is general agreement that fair trial deserves
special priority and that effective defense counsel is essential to
a fair trial.57 The conventional comfort dulls the urgency of

s6 Hu ETAL., supra note 51, at77.
17 For example,Judge Easterbrook
notes that:
Compulsion to represent criminal defendants is scandalous, as are the payment
scales offered to these involuntary agents. You get what you pay for. Unwilling
workers do not provide the level of care that not only defendants but also society
are entitled to expect. At average expenses per case as low as $63, states are providing so little legal time to defendants that much exculpatory evidence and
many valid defenses go begging. A shortfall is less pressing at the bargaining
stage than at trial ... but is unjustifiable in either setting. A society professing
the inestimable value of liberty, yet prepared to more than $20,000 per year to
incarcerate a person, should be willing to pay the market cost of supplying defense services. Increased accuracy will improve deterrence and cut the expense
of imprisonment-not only the outlays to maintain prisons, but also the production foregone and the value of freedom. The Medicare system pays the market
price for medical services; the military system pays the market price for soldiers
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these beliefs, but it does not displace them. Why then is the defense function so seriously neglected? Basically, judges and
scholars agree that criminal defense deserves special priority,
but they also agree that the appropriation of funds is a legislative matter. The second commitment undermines the first.
Surely the appropriation of public funds is central to legislative authority. Courts hesitate to attempt to compel appropriations even to fund their own operations. 5 In the desegregation
context, the Supreme Court has approved of remedies that in
effect force states to spend money. 9 But the right-to-counsel
context is very different. Ajudicial order to spend more money
on indigent defense might prevent a great many violations of the
constitution, but it is hard to describe it as a remedy for any discrete breach of the Sixth Amendment or due process. Thus, in
the desegregation context, the courts have ordered state and local authorities to adopt policies that cost money. In the indigent defense context, the courts would be ordering state and
local authorities to spend money as a policy.
Impact litigation seeking relief from crushing caseloads
bears out the claim that judicial reluctance to compel appropriations undermines the commitment to effective defense representation. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example,
dodged the issue on standing grounds. 60 The Second 6 ' and
Eleventh 62 Circuit Courts of Appeal achieved the same result on
the ground of federal-state comity. The Supreme Court of Iowa

and aircraft carriers; the criminal justice system should pay the market price for
legal services.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargainingas Compromise, 101 YALE LJ. 1969, 1973-74
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding of Judicial
Functions,81 MICH. L. REV. 1687 (1983).
59See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (district court erred under comity doctrine by imposing a property tax levy, but had power to enjoin enforcement of
state property tax caps that prevented raising funds for remedies for past unconstitutional racial discrimination).
o Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
61 Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
62Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
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recently found a challenge to statutory fee limits justiciable, but
rejected the claim on the merits.'
Some courts have agreed that caseload pressures violate the
Constitution, but they have yet to develop an effective remedy.
The remedial challenge is illustrated by the paradox of some
courts conscripting private lawyers into service,4 while other
courts declare this practice an unconstitutional taking of property.65

Recently, the Supreme Court of Arizona overturned a trial
court's order conscripting all members of the local bar for indigent defense-including those with no criminal or trial experience.& The court, however, refused to fashion a remedy more
specific than ordering the (obviously desperate) lower court to
"provide a fair and equitable fee schedule for lawyers appointed
from private practice." 67 Apparently, only one court has gone so
far as to adopt a rebuttablepresumption of ineffectiveness under
Strickland v. Washington.6
None of these responses is very promising. The rebuttable
presumption of prejudice only changes the tie-breaker, when
the real vice of ex post review is the very appearance of inevitability in a record made unchallenged by well-prepared counsel.
Capping assignments to overburdened attorneys does not produce more lawyers for the remaining defendants. Declaring
confiscatory rates of compensation unconstitutional does not
produce money to pay higher hourly rates.
Judicial respect for legislative authority over appropriations
reflects both political principle and political reality. If the basic
defect of indigent defense is inadequate funding, and if appropriation is inherently a legislative prerogative, the conclusion
seems to follow that constitutional doctrine can do little to improve the defense function. 69
Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Des Moines County, 555 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1996).
See KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supranote 23, at 18.

See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972).
"Zarabia v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc).
67 Id. at 9.
6See State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc).
"9See Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New
Paths-A Dead End?, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 9, 114-15 (1996) ("Especially if money, wisely
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Appropriations probably should, and certainly will, remain a
legislative prerogative. But it does not follow that constitutional
doctrine is impotent. The courts might well design a constitutional standard that increases the incentives for legislatures to
provide a decent minima of support for indigent defense. This
in turn might invigorate the defense function without usurping
legislative authority. The courts, however, have excused legislative neglect by testing the adequacy of counsel's performance
after the fact, based on appellate review of a record made by the
very lawyer whose effectiveness is challenged. I turn now to explain how the Supreme Court came to this curious result.
IV. DOCTRINE: FROM GIDEONTO STRICKLAND

The Gideon Court had to choose between two different approaches followed in the applicable precedents. In one line of
cases, the Court had held that due process requires the appointment of counsel for the indigent in state cases whenever a
trial without counsel would be fundamentally unfair. In Powell
v. Alabama--the notorious case of the "Scottsboro boys"-the
Court had held that a trial ending in a death sentence for illiterate defendants, represented by counsel only in name, was
fundamentally unfair. The language of the opinion seemed to
suggest that some serious cases demand defense counsel as a
matter of fundamental fairness. In Betts v. Brady, however, the
Court rejected this view and held that felony trials of unrepresented defendants could be consistent with due process.
Whether fundamental fairness required counsel for a given defendant was to be determined according to the totality of the
circumstances in each case.74
spent, constitutes a sine qua non for elimination of factors conducive to widespread
no-fault ineffectiveness-a plausible hypothesis-I believe there is little in a practical
vein the Court could have done, or can do in the future, to promote competent performance by counsel."). My argument holds the opposite-that by shifting the constitutional focus from the ex post to the ex ante the courts can indeed stimulate the
political process to come forward with the needed funds.
70372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7'287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
72 Id. at
53.
7-316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942).
74Icd
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In the other line of cases, the Court had relied on the equal
protection clause to require the states to waive filing fees and
supply free trial transcripts for indigent defendants contesting
their convictions on appeal. 75 Broadly expressed by Justice
Black, the theme of these cases was that "[t]here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has."76
Both lines of cases were unsatisfying. The due process test
was vague enough to permit almost any result. While the Supreme Court reversed almost all of the cases in which the accused was denied counsel, most such cases never reached the
Supreme Court. The unrepresented convict was in a poor position to prosecute an appeal, and in the few states that had not
gone beyond Betts as a matter of state law, the lower courts were
unsympathetic to claims under Betts.77 Nonetheless, the vagueness of the standard conferred broad discretion on federal
courts entertaining petitions for federal habeas, and the state
courts chafed under this supervision. The equal protection
cases conflicted with the then-prevailing two-tier system of judicial review, under which classifications based on race were
tested with strict scrutiny and other classifications were rubberstamped under the rational-basis test.78 The Court could not
declare poverty a suspect class without prohibiting governments
from making some goods or services available solely to those
with means. Even modest extensions of the Griffin-Douglasprinciple collided with broadly held judgments about the reasonableness of charging fees for public services, such as health care
and higher education.

v. Bennet, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Grif7Smith
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
71 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (plurality
opinion).
Brief of Amici Curae American Civil Liberties Union and the Florida Civil
7See
Liberties Union at 8-11, 48-57, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 155)
(of 139 Betts "special circumstances" cases, the Supreme Court took only 14 but reversed 11).
78See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDAETAL.TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3, at

324-26 (1986).
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In Gideon,79 the Justices unanimously decided to overrule
Betts and require appointed counsel for the indigent in all felony prosecutions. Justice Black wrote for the majority, and as
might be expected, delivered a plea for total incorporation.
With some fairness, Black characterized Betts as unfaithful to
Powell v. Alabama s° but the strongest portion of the opinion
characterizes counsel as fundamental to a fair trial.
Justice Black noted that the prosecuting authority and any
defendant with the means to pay invariably "secure" the best
lawyers they can afford.8 ' And Black quoted extensively from
Powell:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad.
He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger
8 2 of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

Thus Gideon spoke both the language of selective incorporation
and the language of fundamental fairness. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires the availability of counsel at all felony trials, perhaps because the Sixth Amendment includes the right to
counsel, and perhaps because no felony trial is fair without a
lawyer for the defense.83
What Gideon did not speak was the language of equality.
Gideon does not hold that the poor have the right to representation as effective as that provided to the rich by private counsel.
Instead, Gideon sets a floor beneath which the defense of the accused may not fall, regardless of how much more elaborate may

79Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

go See id. at 342-44 ("IT] he Court in Bets v. Brady made an abrupt break with its
own well-considered precedents.").
"Id. at 344.

8

Id. at 345 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, at 68-69 (1932)).

83 Justice Harlan concurred separately, emphasizing how the result could be
reached on grounds of fundamental fairness. See id. at 349 (Harlan,J., concurring).

1997]

1NEFF"ECTIVEASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

267

be the84 defense mounted by another defendant of greater
means.
How high was this floor to be? The Sixth Amendment provides that in "all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
"
the ight... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 85
The incorporation approach, which looks to the text of the
Sixth Amendment rather than to any more general due process
requirement of a fair trial, suggests that the floor could be quite
low. All the Sixth Amendment guarantees is "the Assistance of
Counsel"-not of experienced or dedicated or talented counsel.
In the first few years after Gideon, the text of the Sixth
Amendment seemed less important than the overall fairness of
the proceedings in determining the answers to the questions
Gideon had raised. With respect to the effectiveness of counsel,
the leading pre-Gideon case was Diggs v. Welch.86 Diggs was a federal prisoner who complained on a petition for habeas corpus
that his defense counsel led him to plead guilty on the basis of
unsound advice. The case therefore was governed by the Sixth
Amendment; but Judge Thurman Arnold deftly converted it
into a due process case.
"All [the Sixth] amendment requires is that the accused
shall have the assistance of counsel,"87 Arnold wrote. "It does
not mean that the constitutional rights of the defendant are impaired by counsel's mistakes subsequent to a proper appointment. ' Diggs, therefore, must

8'The Court did not entirely give up on equal protection analysis. The same day
that Gideon came down, the Court decided Douglas v. California,372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Douglasstruck down a California practice of appointing appellate counsel for indigent
defendants only after the appellate court determined, from an examination of the record, that the appeal raised colorable issues requiring the assistance of an appellate
lawyer. The majority was not entirely clear about whether this holding followed from
equal protection or due process; but in any event the Justices' willingness to rely on
equal protection in the appellate, but not the trial, context suggested what subsequent experience would confirm. Poverty was not going to be declared a suspect
class, and Douglas, along with its predecessor Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956),
would be confined to the realm of criminal appeals.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
"1148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
SId. at 669 (footnote omitted).
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rely on the due process clause of the Federal Constitution which guarantees him a fair trial. But, to justify habeas corpus on that ground an extreme case must be disclosed. It must be shown that the proceedings
were a farce and mockery ofjustice. No doubt in such cases careless representation of the defendant by his attorney may contribute to the lack
of due process of the trial as a whole. But if so, it is only one of the factors leading to the violation of petitioner's constitutional rights ....
Carelessness of counsel is not the ground for habeas corpus in such a
case. If relied on it must be as one of the evidentiary facts
8 9 which, coupled with others, show a violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The cases cited in support of this passage include such fundamental fairness decisions as Moore v. Dempsey, Powell v. Alabama,
and Brown v. Mississippi.90
Judge Arnold had some very good reasons for adopting so
harsh a standard. Unlike the claim that counsel was denied to a
defendant, the claim of incompetent representation is easily
made, difficult to evaluate, and costly to remedy after the fact.
At a time when the system struggled to supply lawyers of any sort
even to those felony defendants who insisted on trial, there was
little sympathy for the complaint that the lawyer who had been
found performed ineffectively.
So courts throughout the United States made this "farce
and mockery" standard the prevailing test of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 91 The standard was, needless to say, difficult to satisfy. For example, Judge Henry Friendly wrote for a
unanimous Second Circuit Court of Appeals that counsel was
not ineffective even though he had slept through the testimony

of a prosecution witness.92
The practical difficulties of improving the defense function
were not easily addressed by appellate courts. Between Gideon
and the 1984 decision in Strickland v. Washington, the lower fed89 Id.

90Id. at 669 nn.3-5 (citing, among other cases, Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923),
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and Brown v. Mississippi 297 U.S. 278 (1936)).
91 See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1983) ("By 1962, nine of
the eleven circuits were applying the Diggs 'farce and mockery' standard. The two
remaining circuits adopted the 'farce and mockery' standard in 1965 and 1970, respectively.") (citations omitted).
92 United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970). The court's opinion includes
a footnote expressing a typical view of ineffectiveness claims: "The court is grateful to
[appellate counsel] for his vigorous undertaking of the distasteful task of criticizing a
brother lawyer on Katz' behalf." Id. at 931 n.3.
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eral courts grappled with the problem without clear guidance
from the Supreme Court. 93 The Supreme Court's right-tocounsel cases during this period mainly dealt with the question
of when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applied, rather
than on the question of what the right entailed.
The Court did, however, give the lower courts room to maneuver. The 1970 decision in McMann v. Richardson94 initiated a
trend toward a standard somewhat less forgiving of professional
errors. The defendants in Richardson sought federal habeas
corpus relief from convictions entered after guilty pleas.95 They
claimed that they had pled guilty because they feared that coerced confessions might be admitted against them at trial. 9 The
Court rejected this claim, holding that the decision to plead
guilty amounts to a deliberate by-pass of state remedies, precluding subsequent collateral attack.97 Only if the guilty plea was not
"based on reasonably competent advice" would the conviction
be "open to attack on the ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession."' The
Court stated:
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when
motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in evidence
depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases. On the one hand, uncertainty is inherent in predicting
court decisions; but on the other hand, defendants facing felony charges
are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel. Beyond this
we think the matter, for the most part, should be left to the good sense
and discretion of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that
judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their
courts.

"See Bazelon, supranote 12, at 21-22.
397 U.S. 759 (1970).
9'Id. at 761-64.
9Id.

'7 Id. at 768.

'-Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
9Id.

at 771.
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The opinion does not elaborate on "the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases."
That same term, the Court decided Chambers v. Maroney,'0 a
case that unexpectedly turned out to shed more light on the
Fourth Amendment than it shed on the Sixth. After Chambers'
first trial ended in a mistrial, he was convicted at a second trial
of two robberies. Chambers met his appointed lawyer for the
second trial for the first time in a courthouse hallway on the
morning of the trial.101
Chambers claimed that the late appearance by counsel precluded effective representation at trial.10 2 The only discrete error by counsel claimed by Chambers, however, was the failure to
seek suppression of evidence obtained during two searches, one
of an automobile and one of Chambers' home.0 3 The Court determined that the automobile search was legal and agreed with
the lower court that the reception of the evidence seized in the
residential search was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.04 Accordingly "the claim of prejudice from substitution of counsel
was without substantial basis."105
Only Justice Harlan questioned the Court's casual adoption
of a prejudice requirement. The appropriate test, Harlan argued, did not turn on "a mere assessment of particular missteps
or omissions of counsel" but rather on the "total picture.'

°

Re-

viewing courts should try to determine whether the accused was
"deprived of rudimentary legal assistance. 0°
Justice Harlan had a cogent point; the consequences of a
lawyer's incompetence both pervade and exceed the scope of
0'399 U.S. 42 (1970).
,oId. at 53. Meeting the client on the day of trial is not some relic from the distant
past. See Ogletree, supra note 26, at 88 ("A public defender burdened with inadequate resources and an unreasonable caseload may not even know the client's
name-much less the identity of the witnesses and the theories of the case-until the
day of the trial itself.").
,02
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 53.
103Id. at 53-54.
104 I.
at 54.
,05Id.(footnote omitted).
'6Id. at 60 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
107 Id. (HarlanJ., dissenting).
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the record. Chambers could not point to any discrete error by
counsel, other than the failure to press the meritless search-andseizure claims; but if his trial lawyer was incompetent there was
no way for Chambers, or for his appellate counsel, to reconstruct the possibilities trial counsel had neglected. To limit
scrutiny of counsel's performance to a record made by counsel
is for the reviewing court to don the very blinders worn by counsel.
In any event, particular decisions by counsel are difficult to
evaluate after the fact. Exclusive focus on specific tactical
choices, without reference to the "total picture," leaves no room
for the possibility that counsel was incompetent even though
the court can imagine some competent lawyers making similar
decisions. If Perry Mason pursues a self-defense theory, rather
than insanity, that is one thing. If Bozo the Clown pursues the
same strategy, it hardly follows that effective assistance has been
rendered.
There is, finally, something peculiarly academic about the
Chambers Court's conclusion that because the search-and-seizure
claim was rejected (over dissent) by the Supreme Court, therefore Chambers was not prejudiced by his lawyer's feeble presentation of the claim to the trial court."8 A well-prepared lawyer
might have succeeded in persuading the trial judge to suppress,
even though such a ruling would have been vulnerable to reversal. The government might then have elected to proceed to
trial without the suppressed evidence, and perhaps have lost a
weakened case. Or the government might have offered a favorable plea bargain once the trial court had ruled in favor of the
defense. There is no way of knowing; and thus the assignment
of the burden of proof determines the outcome.
One might have supposed that the ruling in Chambers cast
the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant claiming ineffective assistance, but the opinion says nothing about burdens
of proof. The Court further clouded the picture by deciding
during the 1970s a series of cases in which the government had in
one way or another interfered with defense counsel's prepara"0 Id. at 54.
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tion or presentation of the case.'09 In these cases, the Court
"uniformly found unconstitutional error without any showing of
prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented
from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding."" The Court adopted a similar rule of automatic reversal
in conflicts-of-interest cases in which the trial court fails to remedy a conflict apprehended by a lawyer representing multiple
defendants."'
Thus, throughout the 1970s, the Supreme Court did not offer guidance about ineffective assistance claims. The accused
was entitled to representation "within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 2 What this meant
was anybody's guess. As for the prejudice question, Chambers
looked in one direction, while the government-interference and
conflict-of-interest cases looked in quite another.
Left with this much discretion, the lower courts developed a
variety of approaches."1
For the most part they abandoned the
"farce and mockery" standard. They tended to evaluate counsel's performance according to the facts of each case, with deference to counsel's choices, rather than promulgating specific
guidelines for counsel to follow in every case. Also, for the most
part they required the defendant to establish that counsel's unprofessional errors prejudiced the accused; but some courts re109See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial court refused to permit

counsel to consult with defendant during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853 (1975) (state statute authorized judge to dispense with closing argument at
bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (state statute requiring defendant testify first, or not at all, during defense case).
"' McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970). See also United States v.
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25 (1984).
. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). The Court later held that the rule of
automatic reversal applies only to those cases in which counsel or the defendant
brings the conflict to the attention of the trial court. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335 (1980). If the conflict is not called to the attention of the court, the defendant
can obtain reversal only by showing an "actual" as opposed to "potential" conflict and
that this conflict adversely influenced counsel's performance. But Cuyler did not require the defense to establish that the conflict influenced counsel in such a way that
the result of the trial might have been different.
1 McMann,397 U.S. at 770.
"3 See Bruce Andrew Green, Note, A FunctionalAnalysis of the Effective Assistance of
Counsel 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1053 (1980); Philip H. Newman, Note, Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel: The LingeringDebate,65 CORNELL L. REv. 659 (1980).
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quired that, once the defense established counsel's negligence,
the government prove beyond reasonable doubt that the denial
of the right to counsel had been harmless.
Judge David Bazelon, a vigorous critic of the quality of defense representation, offered new and stronger medicine in the
celebrated case of United States v. Decoster."4 Decoster was accused of being one of three men who had mugged Roger5
Crump outside the Golden Gate Bar in Washington, DC.11
Two police officers witnessed the robbery; each officer gave
chase to one of the muggers. Officer Box caught up with and
arrested Decoster inside a hotel lobby.11 7 Crump identified Decoster as one of his assailants." 8
At trial, Decoster testified that he had had a few drinks with
Crump but had left him inside the bar and returned to the hotel, where he lived. 19 The jury rejected his story and convicted
him of aiding and abetting an armed robbery. 2 ' On appeal, he
claimed that the evidence was insufficient and that he could not
be convicted of armed robbery since the principals had pled
guilty only to simple robbery.12 1 Judge Bazelon, joined by J.
Skelly Wright, dismissed these contentions in footnote 1 of a
fourteen page opinion devoted to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2
Bazelon noted that Decoster's lawyer had been lackadaisical
in seeking Decoster's release on bond pending trial; that he answered ready for trial without having responded to the government's demand for notice of alibi witnesses; and that he agreed
to waive a jury (the government refused to agree to this) without realizing that the trial judge had accepted the guilty pleas of

I]'.

United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter Decoster

"'

"' For the facts, see United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979) [hereinafter Decoster II].

116 Id.

1

7

Id. at 200.

"aId.
119'd.
120 id.

, Decosterl,487 U.S. 1197, 1199 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
122 id.
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the two other muggers. 23 These signs of ineffective assistance
prompted the court of appeals to remand the case for a hearing
to determine whether counsel's apparent failings had some justification. 24
To guide the district court, the DecosterI court set out a new
and demanding Sixth Amendment standard. The defendant
would have the right to "reasonably competent assistance,"
which would include, but not be limited to, certain specific duties. Among these duties would be conferring with the accused;
securing the client's rights before trial (such as the right to remain silent and any right to pretrial release); and "appropriate
investigation," which meant that "in most cases a defense attorney, or his agent, should interview not only his own witnesses
but also those that the government intends to call, when they
are accessible."'1
But the really revolutionary aspect of Decoster I lay in the
presumption of prejudice that would attend deviations from the
enumerated duties. "If a defendant shows a substantial violation
of any of these requirements he has been denied effective representation unless the government, 'on which is cast the burden
of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby.' '1

26

If the government failed to

establish harmless error, retrial would be required.
Because the courts never adopted performance standards,
we do not know how such standards would have influenced the
defense function. If the Decoster I approach had prevailed, the
avenues of attack on a criminal conviction would be broad indeed. Retrial would be necessary whenever the defense could
point, on appeal, to an exculpatory factual possibility that the
government could not disprove either with affidavits or the trial
record. Arguably, ensuring the quality of the defense bar would
have become an essential feature of effective law enforcement.
If that transformation had occurred, it would have been a tremendous benefit to those persons who are charged with crimes
"

Id. at 1199-1201.

121Id. at 1201.

Id. at 1204.

2 Id.
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that they did not commit, whatever the cost in terms of resources and finality.
But it is possible-in my view, at least-that performancebased standards would have worked no such revolution. There
is more to effective assistance than following a checklist, and it is
more than possible to go through the motions of the checklist
without putting on a vigorous or well-thought-out defense. Defense lawyers would have learned how to comply with the performance standards with the least effort (perhaps even pleading
clients out earlier and earlier to avoid the duties attending motions and trial preparation). Appellate courts, faced with the
specter of costly retrials that promised no improvement on the
original, would likely dilute the performance standards to the
prevailing level of indigent defense performance.
Judge Bazelon correctly pointed out the central weakness in
Sixth Amendment doctrine: looking backward at the trial to determine whether counsel's deficiencies might have permitted an
unjust conviction overlooks that the trial itself is a creature of
counsel's performance.127 But this argument proves too much;
for if the record is suspect, the government could not rebut a
presumption of prejudice simply by proving the defendant's
guilt on the basis of the record. In effect, DecosterI looked to a
rule of automatic reversal whenever counsel failed to perform
the enumerated duties.
In a world in which most defendants get no trial at all, the
costs of such an approach were thought to be prohibitive. On
remand, the district court found that counsel's investigation
had been adequate.1 2 The D.C. Circuit panel reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, applying the standard set out in
Decoster .129The D.C. circuit judges then granted the govern-

ment's motion for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel's judgThe panel's second
ment, and affirmed the conviction!"
'2 See id. ("proof of prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because
counsel has been ineffective.") (footnote omitted).
' See Decoster 1, 624 F.2d 196, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944
(1979).
" See id at 300-13 (Bazelon,J., dissenting).
'30
United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 944 (1979) [hereinafter Decoster III].
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opinion is known as "DecosterIf" and the en banc court's decision as "DecosterHI."
Judge Leventhal's opinion in Decoster III, joined by four of
the nine judges, rejected both the enumeration of specific duties and the requirement that the government prove that dereliction of those duties was harmless. "The claimed deficiency
must fall measurably below accepted standards... but it cannot
be established merely by showing that counsel's acts or omissions deviated from a checklist of standards."1

stand on its own facts.

31

Each case must

As for prejudice, the defense must

"demonstrate ... a likelihood of effect on the outcome." 32

In two cases decided in 1984, the Supreme Court followed
33
Judge Leventhal's lead. One of these, Strickland v. Washington,
has become the fountainhead of modern ineffective assistance
law. The other, United States v. Cronic,'T has faded into relative
obscurity. Cronic,however, makes graphically clear what is wrong
with Strickland.
The government charged Cronic with mail fraud, arising
out of a complex "check kiting" scheme. It took the prosecution four-and-a-half years to investigate the case and review the
thousands of relevant documents. Cronic's court-appointed attorney was a young real estate lawyer who had never conducted
a jury trial. Nonetheless, the trial court set a trial date only
twenty-five days after the appointment.' -5
After the jury convicted, Cronic appealed, claiming ineffective assistance.3 6 He did not, however, complain of any specific
errors of omission or commission by trial counsel. Rather, he
claimed that the circumstances of the case-the complexity of
the facts and the law, the inexperience of counsel, and the limited time to prepare-justified an inference of ineffectiveness.

"'
Id. at 214-15.
2
3

"'
"

215.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
Id. at

"

Id. at
Id. at

649.
650.
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The Tenth Circuit agreed with Cronic;5 7 the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed."'
Conceding that certain circumstances make it impossible
for even a good lawyer to effectively represent the defendant's
case, the Cronic Court described those circumstances as extreme. The only case Justice Stevens cited as an example in
which an inference of ineffective was appropriate is Powell v.
Alabama, in which an out-of-state lawyer was appointed for all
the defendants on the day of the trial. Absent such extreme circumstances, the CronicCourt held that the defendant can "make
out a claim of ineffective assistance only by pointing to specific
errors made by trial counsel."13 9
The Strickland case set out the standards for evaluating
claims that discrete errors by counsel justify a new trial. 40 Strickland pled guilty to three murders, and was sentenced to death
after trial of the sentencing issue. 4' On collateral review, he
claimed that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately
investigate the defendant's background and mental condition at
the time of the crimes. 142
The Court required a convicted defendant to establish that
defense counsel's unprofessional errors prejudiced the defense:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective
as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a
breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.1

The Court refused to enumerate any specific duties for defense
lawyers. Rather, "the performance inquiry must be whether
7
,s
Cronic v. United States, 675 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1982).
Cronic,466 U.S. at 649.
's' Id. at 666 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
"oStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
"' Id. at 671-75.
11 Id. at 675.
14 Id. at 687.
2
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counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. '4 By "prejudice," the Court meant that the defendant
"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
46
45
OnlyJustice Marshall dissented.
would have been different.',

The Cronic and Strickland decisions reflect the Burger
Court's characteristic refusal to look beyond the case at bar and
consider the systemic consequences of decision. On appeal, the
defendant's guilt appears certain even if trial counsel botched
the investigation; only a heroic second-effort by appellate counsel can challenge that impression. Retrial is a costly remedy.
Strickland follows these premises where they lead to a vaguelyworded but forgiving standard for counsel's performance, and a
strong and precisely-worded burden, imposed on the defense,
to prove prejudice.
V. CRITIQUE: THE INHERENT FLAWS OF ExPOST REVIEW

Ineffective assistance doctrine has, not surprisingly, done littie to improve the overall quality of the defense function. The
focus is never on how good the defense lawyers are, but always
on how well they did in a case that is already over. Taking selective incorporation seriously-by defining the "assistance of
Counsel" by specific standards, as the Decoster I court had
done147 -conflicted with the apparent uselessness of ordering
retrials for "plainly" guilty defendants. Instead, Strickland married the worst features of selective incorporation and fundamental fairness, by characterizing counsel's assistance as a selfcontained right, but a right that could be violated with impunity
absent a "breakdown in the adversary process."4
If effective defense counsel is really essential to a fair trial,
than a showing of ineffective assistance is, without more, proof
" Id. at 688.
'"Id.at 694.
'"Id. at 706 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan dissented on the ground
that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, but he concurred with the
general standard set out by the Court. Id. at 701 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting
in part).
4
7Decosterl, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
4 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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of an unfair trial. If there was a "breakdown in the adversary
process," it shouldn't matter that counsel made some discrete
error that fell outside the range of customary performance.
In the aftermath of Gideon the courts began to think about
the effectiveness of defense counsel as an important but dispensable safeguard against an unfair trial. This was a hangover
from fundamental fairness, as the "farce and mockery" standard
suggests. Slowly but steadily the judges came to think of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a self-contained right
made effective against the states by the incorporation doctrine,
rather than as a component, albeit a crucial component, of the
due process right to a fair trial. The unrecognized consequence
of divorcing the right to counsel from the right to a fair trial,
however, has been the counterfactual-even Khafkaesque-assumption that when the poor performance of defense counsel
undermines the fairness of the trial, the situation will be manifest to a reviewing court after the fact.
Counsel's performance cannot be separated from the trial
that counsel conducted. In particular, because the trial record
will be limited by defense counsel's investigation, the failure to
pursue exculpatory possibilities will not be in the record at all.
Justice Marshall, the lone dissenter from the Strickland standard,
hit the nail on the head:
[I] t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a
trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if
his lawyer had been competent. Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain

how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.

The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by
the possibility that evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing
from
the record precisely because of the incompetence of defense coun14 9

sel.

4 id.
at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). This is precisely the
same point that was made, decisively, against the rule of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455

(1942). SeeYale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the FourteenthAmendment: A Dialogue
on "The Most PervasiveRight" of an Accused, 30 U. Ca-H. L. REV. 1, 42-57 (1962) (provid-

ing a detailed examination of the record in Betts, and suggesting that Betts may have
innocent and that a good lawyer might have won his case). The gist of it is captured
in an exchange from that classic dialogue:
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In death cases, the extreme stakes and the extended timeperiod permit post-conviction counsel to seek affidavits from
uncalled witnesses and to perform neglected scientific tests. But
in other cases, who is going to interview the witnesses if trial
counsel did not?
It is problematic to evaluate a record made by counsel to
evaluate counsel's performance. Psychological research suggests that human beings tend to underestimate the contingency
of past events. Asking an appellate judge to imagine an exculpatory hypothesis confronts not just the rational reluctance of
judges to order retrials, but also the irrational reluctance of
human minds to accept that the past might have been different.50
Any ex post approach can remedy defective assistance only in
cases in which someone takes a sustained interest in litigation
on behalf of the defendant. In misdemeanor, juvenile, and
even felony cases in which prolonged incarceration is not imposed, Strickland is virtually a dead letter. Even when the defendant is serving a long sentence, a searching review of the record
must be made by competent counsel before a valid Strickland
claim can be vindicated. In a system that fails to furnish an adequate supply of good lawyers in the first instance, how are those
convicted on account of bad lawyering supposed to bring Strickland into play?
The real impact of Strickland is not on the performance of
defense counsel. Sixth Amendment doctrine provides virtually
no incentive for anybody-judges, prosecutors, public defenders, or legislatures-to upgrade the effectiveness of lawyers for
the indigent. Instead, Strickland amounts to a constitutional
trump on any rules of waiver or finality. Any failure to raise a
claim that retrospective analysis shows would have been a clear
"What are you telling me now? That every unrepresented defendant is actually
prejudiced?"
"No, only that we can never tell whether or not he was."
Id. at 42. If we substitute "inadequately represented" for "unrepresented," we have a
critique of Stricklandnearly as powerful as the critique of Betts.
5o See G.V. Bodenhausen, Second-Guessing theJury: Stereotyping and Hindsight Biases in
Perceptions of Court Cases, 20J. APP. Soc. PSYCH. 1112 (1990) (subjects put weight on
known jury verdict in assessing guilt of defendants).
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winner amounts to ineffective assistance; indeed, this is about
the only thing that does amount to ineffective assistance. In effect, Strickland amounts to a rule against waiver of winning
claims in criminal cases.
This may or may not be a good rule, but it is surely not all
that should be demanded of the defense bar. The typical defendant is not much threatened by a negligent failure to assert
the statute of limitations; clear winners are uncommon and usually spotted even by bad lawyers. What the typical defendant
really needs is not competent advice about clear winners, but
competent advice about questions that have no clear-cut answer.
Should we take the government's plea offer? Should we rely
on self-defense, or on accident, or on insanity? Should we put
the defendant on the stand? Can we trust witness X to testify as
we expect? These are the kinds of judgments that people need
defense lawyers to make. They are also the kind of judgments
that can rarely be challenged successfully under Strickland. As
"tactical choices" to which reviewing courts afford a "heavy
measure of deference," the consequences of which are imponderable and thus presumptively not prejudicial, counsel's key
decisions are virtually beyond review. It hardly follows, however,
that typical indigent defenders make these decisions as well as
they could be made.
Despite its general futility, the Strickland standard invites a
great deal of litigation. In 1992, I served as a Reporter for a series of seminars for state court judges organized by the Illinois
Judicial Conference. As part of that project, I agreed to prepare
a report on Sixth Amendment law in Illinois. "No problem," I
thought. "I'll just run 'Strickland v. Washington' through the
computer and see what salutes. Then copy and read all the
cases, and I'll be done." Oh sweet naivete! In Illinois alone the
appellate courts decide about a hundred Strickland cases a year.
Very few of these cases result in reversal, and those few convictions that are reversed are subject to retrial. Nonetheless, it is
impossible for a criminal defendant to waive a winning argument in Illinois. Theoretically, failure to appeal a claim waives
the claim. Theoretically, the same is true of failure to raise a
claim in the first collateral attack on the judgment in state
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court. But if counsel's assistance is defective, the procedural default is in either case excused. 5 '
Thus the convict can "tile" ineffective assistance claims in
unlimited layers. For example, assume trial counsel missed a
clear winner. That, by hypothesis, is both negligent and prejudicial. Failure to raise the winning claim on appeal would waive
the claim, but if appellate counsel fails to raise it that too is ineffective assistance. In Pennsylvania v. Finley,152 the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to collateral review proceedings. For purposes of state law, however, ineffective assistance deprives an Illinois post-conviction proceeding of
preclusive effect. 53 Thus, if the lawyer bringing the first postconviction petition fails to raise the winning claim that again
would be ineffective assistance, that claim would not be barred
on a second post-conviction petition.
Strickland's invitation to protracted litigation extends to the
federal courts. For example, in Stone v. Powell 154 the Supreme
Court carried the majority's hostility to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the point of barring the federal district
courts from hearing Fourth Amendment claims on federal habeas. The Court subsequently held, in Kimmelman v. Monrison, 55

that if the defendant claims to have lost his Fourth Amendment
claim in state court on account of ineffective assistance, the federal
district courts may entertain the claim. Stricklands ex post approach thus has the power to dissolve even rules expressly
adopted to terminate relitigation of criminal cases.

"' See People v. Gaines, 473 N.E.2d 868, 875 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1131
(1985) (ineffective assistance claim raised for first time in post-conviction proceeding
cognizable because trial counsel represented defendant on appeal, and "[i] t would be
unreasonable to expect appellate counsel to convincingly raise and argue his own incompetency"); People v. Flores, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1086 (Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 831 (1993) (when a defendant "files a second or subsequent post-conviction petition in which he raises meritorious claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which could not have been raised in a prior post-trial proceeding, the defendant
is entitled to consideration of those claims").
,12
481 U.S. 551 (1987).
"' See Flores,606 N.E.2d at 1086.
428 U.S. 465 (1976).
...
,'477 U.S. 365 (1986).
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As Professor Bator pointed out in a classic article, finality in
criminal cases has both economic and psychological value.5 6
Economically, the resources consumed in relitigation are wasted
unless the second proceeding is clearly more likely to reach a
just result than the first (in which case the resources consumed
in the first proceeding are a waste). Psychologically, relitigation
trivializes the trial, leaving the accused to gnaw the bones of
hope and judges and lawyers to console themselves with the
thought that their errors can be corrected later. Relitigation,
Bator concluded, is justifiable only when some procedural flaw
in the original proceedings, or some institutional concern such
counsels review of the trial court result in another
as federalism,
57
1

forum.

Bator was quick to point out that lack of counsel is just the
sort of procedural flaw that justifies relitigation.'55 If Strickland
really did much to improve the defense function, perhaps the
futile but endless cycle of ineffective assistance litigation would
be worth the effort. But if ex post review is simply incapable of
identifying and correcting most errors by defense counsel,
Strickland gives us the worst of all worlds. The original proceedings were flawed by the inadequacy of indigent defense, but after another bout of litigation, the reviewing court will all but
invariably conclude either that no negligence by defense counsel is manifest in the record, or that the defendant failed to
prove that counsel's alleged errors changed the result. In a nutshell, the Strickland test compromises the finality interest without advancing the fairness of the trial.
In one sense, the critics of Strickland rightly claim that the
Court betrayed the promise of Gideon. But Stricklands critics
have missed two important points, one descriptive, the other
Descriptively, once Gideon took the selectiveprescriptive.
incorporation route, it was natural-if not inevitable-for appel156Paul

M. Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners,

L. REV. 441, 451-53 (1963).
76 HARV.
7
11 Id. at 455-62.
Id. at 458 ("Deprivation of counsel in cases where the demands of fairness embodied in the due process clause call for representation by counsel is, I submit, precisely the kind of error which should deprive a state litigation of sanctity.").
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late judges to think of counsel's performance as a self-contained
constitutional right, rather than as an essential element in a fair
trial. This focus on the right to counsel led to the ex post approach, which is inherently incapable of determining whether
the accused received a fair trial. To the extent that Gideon detached the right to counsel from the due process right to a fair
trial, Strickland is no pretender but rather Gideon's rightful heir.
The prescriptive point is related to the descriptive one.
Critics of Strickland have called for modifying, rather than abandoning, the ex post inquiry into counsel's performance.159 They
suggest performance-based standards, such as those advocated
by Judge Bazelon, and a presumption of prejudice. Strickland
rightly recognized that no check-list adequately measures effective representation. A savvy defense lawyer might be able to obtain the best possible results for her client with a single
telephone call. A lawyer who dutifully interviewed witnesses and
filed motions, without thinking about the defenses the witnesses' stories suggest or how to support the motions made,
might well get the client more time than he deserved.
Abandoning the presumption of prejudice would do even
greater damage to the finality interest than Strickland. Under
Strickland, ineffective assistance is easily alleged but almost impossible to prove. Strickland thus generates much futile appellate litigation, but few retrials. A presumption of prejudice
would lead either to a flood of retrials (and a corresponding
groundswell of new ineffective assistance claims, as inmates see
that release is possible), or to judicial tolerance of outrageously
bad performances by defense counsel. Following Professor Bator, we might ask what point new trials would have, if as seems
likely, defense counsel would perform no better on the second
go-round.

159
See, e.g., Klein, supra note 3, at 654-55 (advocating performance standards);
Geimer, supra note 3, at 168-71 (same); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the
Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standardfor Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 437 (1987) (advocating performance standards with burden
of showing "insubstantial" omission on government as supplement to Stricklandtest);
Berger, supra note 69, at 95-96 (suggesting retaining deficient performance prong but
replacing prejudice prong with traditional harmless-error analysis).
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Ultimately, no ex post standard can remedy the real defects
of the defense function. In the first place, ex post review is simply incapable of detecting ineffective assistance. In the second
place, ex post review can remedy ineffective assistance only at the
expense of the finality interest. Maybe a performance-based
standard coupled with a presumption of prejudice could finally
bludgeon legislatures into providing the needed funds. It seems
far more likely that indigent defenders would learn to go
through the motions of following the approved checklist, while
appellate judges devised ways to water down the performance
standard until the standard matched the performance of local
defense counsel. The contrary hypothesis assumes that a very
large number of convictions of guilty persons in serious cases
would need to be reversed to get the attention of the legislature.
Appellate judges are unlikely to let that happen, but if they did
it would be a very costly way (indeed, a bloody way) to reform
indigent defense.
The case against performance standards applies a fortiori to
reliance on tort liability to ensure adequate defense representation. Like the Strickland test, tort liability depends on showing
negligence and prejudice. Without negligence there is no liability, even though the client is innocent, and without prejudice, there are no damages. Tort liability, then, cannot really
improve on Strickland. But by imposing significant costs on indigent defense lawyers (whether through insurance payments or
the risk of adverse judgments), tort liability would only exacerbate the underlying resource deficiency. The courts understandably have given malpractice suits against public defenders
a chilly reception.' 6°

"6See, e.g., Harold H. Chen, Note, MalpracticeImmunity: An Illegitimate and Ineffective
Response to the Indigent-Defense risis, 45 DUKE LJ. 783, 795-802 (1996) (discussing an
emerging trend toward recognizing qualified or even absolute immunity to malpractice actions against indigent defense lawyers; the Note is critical of the trend). The
Supreme Court has rejected federal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of
Sixth Amendment rights for want of state action. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S.
312 (1981).
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VI. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE EXANTEPARiTY STANDARD
The limitations of ex post approaches suggest the possibility
of assessing the adequacy of defense counsel prior to the trial.
This possibility raises at least several specific questions for analysis. First, how could a litigant, practically speaking, raise an ex
ante challenge? Second, if a court agreed to hear an ex ante
challenge, what specific standard should the court apply?
Third, if the court found ineffective assistance before trial, what
remedy could the court order? Fourth, is there some way for a
jurisdiction to comply with the appropriate ex ante standard
without either spending vast sums or risking reversals in serious
cases? Fifth, how would the recognition of an ex ante standard
change the role of ex post review under Strickland v. Washington?
I address each of these questions in turn.
A. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF AN EXANTE CHALLENGE

Institutional reform litigation, exemplified by the prisonconditions cases, 61 offers one avenue for testing the systemic
adequacy of the defense function. In federal courts, however,
the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris162 bars criminal defendants from contesting the prosecution through collateral
civil litigation. When Georgia's indigent defense system was
challenged in a civil suit, the Eleventh Circuit agreed that Strickland did not-logically, could not-supply the standard for resolving an ex ante challenge. 63 But the court ultimately
concluded that the action was barred by the abstention doctrine.164 Basically, before the defendant is charged, he has no
standing to complain about indigent defense; after he is
charged, his claims must be brought in the course of the criminal proceedings.""
"' See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 353-54 n.1 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (listing 24 states in which the prisons were under court orders).
162 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
16 Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988).
Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (both standing doctrine and abstention doctrine prevent federal court from enjoining future acts of racial discrimination
in administration of state criminal prosecutions); Bundy v. Rudd, 581 F.2d 1126 (5th
Cir. 1978) (charged defendant could not seek federal court order requiring state
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It might be possible for the defense lawyers themselves to
sue, as being overworked and underpaid surely qualify as injuryin-fact. To raise the constitutional rights of their clients, however, the lawyers would need to establish that the right-holders
could not vindicate their own claims. 166 This approach was accepted by the Supreme Court of Iowa, a state forum not constrained by the federal abstention doctrine. 167 If the reason for
the clients' inability to assert their own rights is the abstention
doctrine, it would seem that Younger bars federal suits by defense lawyers just as it bars claims by defendants.
If the justiciability hurdle proves insurmountable, it should
still be possible to attack indigent defense systems on an ex ante
basis. Counsel for criminal defendants should move before trial
for a ruling that the indigent defense system violates the Sixth
Amendment by failing to secure the defense representation
equal to the task of defending the charge. A record should be
made of the inadequacy of the defense function in comparison
to the prosecution.
If the trial judge offers a continuance, counsel should respond that caseload pressures and inadequate support services
mean that no amount of additional time could result in constitutionally effective representation. At the same time, the indigent defense lawyers should make similar motions in other
pending cases. Finally, such a motion should not be understood
court to permit defendant's chosen counsel to conduct defense); Williams v. Rubiera,
539 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1976) (federal plaintiffs not facing pending charges had no
standing to challenge state failure to provide appointed counsel in misdemeanor
cases; plaintiff facing pending charge barred from federal relief by Younger doctrine);
Wallace v. Kern, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (rejecting plea for order
limiting assignments to legal aid lawyers on federal/state comity grounds). But see
Gilliard v. Carson, 348 F. Supp. 757 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Roger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey
v. Miller: The Casefor A StructuralInjunction to Improve IndigentDefense Services, 101 YALE
L.J. 481, 492-96 (1991).
" See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195-97 (1976) (brewers may assert equal protection rights of young men to buy beer); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443-46
(1972) (sellers of contraceptives may assert sexual privacy rights of consumers); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (white seller to black buyer may assert
buyer's equal protection rights to defend action on racially restrictive covenant when
purchaser could not intervene under local rules).
'67 Lewis v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Des Moines County, 555 N.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Iowa
1996).
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as a waiver of speedy trial rights. The Sixth Amendment guarantees both speedy trial and effective assistance of counsel, not
one or the other.
If the trial judge denies the motion, and the defendant is
convicted, the appeal from the denial of the pretrial motion
cannot be based on Strickland v. Washington. As the Eleventh
Circuit recognized in the Luckey litigation, Strickland applies only
to claims brought ex post.
Where a party seeks to overturn his or her conviction, powerful considerations warrant granting this relief only when that
defendant has been prejudiced. The Strickland Court noted the
following factors in favor of deferential scrutiny of a counsel's
performance in the post-trial context: concerns for finality; concern that extensive post-trial burdens would discourage counsel
from accepting cases; and concern for the independence of
counsel. These considerations do not apply when only prospective relief is sought.'6
The Strickland Court did not have an ex ante challenge before it. The Court's opinion expressly confines the two-part ineffectiveness test to a "convicted defendant's claim that counsel's
assistance" was defective. 169
Prior to the trial, there is no way to test the effectiveness of
counsel except according to some circumstantial standard such
as the parity standard. Trial courts will be faced with ex ante
challenges in the future. Accordingly, the appellate court
should review the denial of a pretrial motion alleging inevitable
ineffective assistance on its own merits, rather than under the
Strickland test.
The Strickland standard is explained by the expense and delay of the retrial remedy. Defendants bringing ex ante challenges are not sandbagging. They are, instead, saying that they
reasonably anticipate an unfair trial that is not susceptible to
subsequent review. The state whose neglect undermines the
fairness of the trial should not be permitted to lean on the finality of trials as ajustification.
'6'Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017 (footnote omitted).
169Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (emphasis added).
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The Strickland Court itself felt that when the state interfered
with defense counsel's representation, or when counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, the usual inquiry into
negligence and prejudice is inappropriate. 70 When the state
denies counsel or interferes with counsel's performance, prejudice "is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not
worth the cost ....

Moreover, such circumstances involve im-

pairments of the Sixth Amendment right that are easy to identify and, for that reason and because the prosecution is directly
responsible, easy for the government to prevent."171 Likewise,
proof of prejudice is not required in conflict-of-interest cases,
because "it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense" and because of "the ability of trial courts to make early
inquiry in certain situations likely to give rise to conflicts .... 172
In Cronic, by contrast, the issue before the Court was
whether the Sixth Amendment required a new trial after the
trial court refused to grant a thirty day continuance to enable
inexperienced counsel to prepare for a complicated case. 73
Even in Cronic, however, the Court ruled that "only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness
can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into
counsel's actual performance at trial."'174 Cronic, according to
the Court, wasn't such a case.
Perhaps it wasn't. The trial court did grant defense counsel
a twenty-five day continuance to prepare for the trial. Twentyfive days to prepare a case for trial would be a gift from God to
most big-city public defenders. They could accept that gift only
at the cost of underserving other clients in other cases. The
prevailing neglect of the indigent defense function thus partakes of both Powell v. Alabama and the conflicts-of-interest cases.
The circumstantial indicators of ineffectiveness are stronger
than in Cronic,and efforts by counsel to overcome those circum-

'

70

Id. at 692.

171id.
172&

'73 United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 650 (1984).

74 Id. at 662 (approving Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
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stances in one case conflict with the representation of clients in
other cases.
Appellate review of ex ante challenges to systems of indigent
defense therefore should not be reduced to case-by-case challenges to individual convictions under Strickland. A state convict
who challenged the system of indigent defense before trial, and
whose appeal was rejected for failure to satisfy Strickland's ex post
standard, could relitigate the issue on a petition for federal habeas corpus 75s Such a claim would fall within the classic understanding of habeas as a remedy for detention absent fair trial. If
the petitioner's claim is correct, his trial was unfair in a way that
ex post review cannot disclose. A petitioner who made, rather
than waived, an ex ante challenge in the state courts could have
that claim vindicated on federal habeas.
If, moreover, a state's appellate courts insist that case-by-case
application of Strickland supplies the only avenue for testing ineffective assistance claims, it would be plausible to revisit the
idea of institutional reform litigation. In Gerstein v. Pugh,176 the
Court agreed that the Younger doctrine did not bear a civil challenge to the state's failure to provide a prompt judicial determination of probable cause following warrantless arrest.1 77 Such a
claim could not be remedied by litigation within the criminal
process, because the plaintiffs challenged the very time it took
to raise the issue in state court. The constitutional violation in
Gersteinwas complete before the defendant ever saw ajudge.
If the state courts hold that Strickland supplies the exclusive
vehicle for litigating ineffective assistance, the federal courts
should apply the Gerstein exception to the Younger doctrine. Indigent defense lawyers could bring the claim, seeking relief as
parties injured by the violation of their clients' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The state's erroneous application of
the Strickland standard for post-conviction challenges to pre-trial

"-'See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1997).
,76420 U.S. 103 (1975).
177Id. at 108 n.9 ("The injunction was not directed at the state prosecutions as
such, but only at the legality of pretrial detention without ajudicial hearing, an issue
that could not be raised in defense of the criminal prosecution. The order to hold
preliminary hearings could not prejudice the conduct of the trial on the merits.").
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challenges would prevent litigation of the federal claim in the
state courts. The challenge to the system of indigent defense
would be collateral to pending criminal cases. So long as the
complaint sought only prospective relief, there would be no interference in pending state cases. Thus, one way or another, it
should be possible to litigate the claim that the institutional
conditions of indigent defense fall below constitutional standards before a defendant represented by that system has been
convicted.
B. THE CASE FOR THE PARITY STANDARD

Those who accept my argument for testing counsel's capacity for effective representation ex ante might well disagree about
the precise form an ex ante standard might take. Following the
lead of Gideon, one might argue that the appropriate ex ante
standard is whether counsel's circumstances permit the minimal
functions necessary for compliance with the Sixth Amendment.
Following Powell v. Alabama and, in a way, Strickland itself, one
could argue that counsel should be able to contest the issue
more or less equally against the state. That is to say, one might
accept Strickland's equation of effective assistance with the fairness of the trial, but recognize that a trial between unequal adversaries is not reliable.
In keeping with my skepticism about selective incorporation
and corresponding preference for due process adjudication, I
favor the latter course. That should not be understood as opposition to an absolute, as opposed to a relative, standard of ex ante
effectiveness. Building on the American Bar Association's Standardsfor CriminalJustice,17 it might be possible for courts to fashion a workable definition of the minimum qualifications,
minimum support, and maximum caseload that indigent defenders can sustain without lapsing into constitutionally deficient representation.
But such standards are difficult to define, and more difficult
to maintain over time. There is the standing danger that professional bodies will change their views (one way or another)
7

ABA

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-PROSECUTiON AND DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

(3d ed. 1993).
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with the knowledge that their judgments may acquire the force
of constitutional law. More fundamentally, minimal standards
fail to account for the basic truth that some rough parity between opponent's capacity for litigation is essential if our adversary system is to generate reliable results.
The same prosecutor's office that routinely prevails at trial
over the public defender somehow rarely wins a high-profile
case against well-compensated private counsel. Anyone who
reads the newspapers could cite the cases of John Delorean,
David Hinkley, Bernard Goetz, John Gotti, Klaus von Bulow,
William Kennedy Smith, Stacey Koon and O.J. Simpson. Given
high-quality defense work, it is difficult to convict the patently
guilty. Given indigent defense, it is too easy to convict the innocent.
I do not argue that the public fisc should elevate the quality
of indigent defense to the level of the private bar's most successful attorneys. I do claim, however, that the public fisc should
elevate the quality of indigent defense to the level of the prosecutor's office. Murray Schwartz, in an important paper, developed the relation between parity and justice in the adversary
system:
Because only in rare cases will the parties be equal in their presenta-

tional ability, it is not possible to reach the evenhandedness of an impartial tribunal charged with the prosecution and presentation functions.
Nevertheless, it is critical that the imbalance be reduced as much as possible, and this can be best accomplished through two postulates relating
to the professional representatives: the Postulate of Equal Competence
and the Postulate of Equal Adversariness.
The Postulate of Equal Competence is a shorthand way of saying
that for the adversary system to function properly, the opposing representatives (advocates) should be roughly equal in their ability to perform
their professional functions. The Postulate of Equal Adversariness is a
shorthand way of saying that the opposing advocates should also be
roughly equal in their dedication to the cause of their principals and in
their opposition to the cause of their opponents. The postulates do
not-cannot-require true equality; they do assert that there should not
be gross disparities in these respects.179
'79 Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FouND. REs.J. 543,
547. Schwartz distinguishes the criminal from the civil system by suggesting that in
criminal cases, the defense should enjoy certain advantages over the prosecution. Id.
at 549. That of course does not deny my claim that indigent defense should, when
necessary, be brought up to the standard of the prosecution by constitutional ruling.
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On an instrumental theory of adjudication, "equality of competence and adversariness1 80of the advocates is the best way to ensure correct outcomes."
As for how counsel's competence might be assessed before
the fact, the truth is that consumers of legal services make this
very judgment all the time. Whenever a paying client hires a
private lawyer, the client makes inquiries designed to determine
the competence of potential representatives. Reputation is built
on successful experience, and the reputation of most lawyers
can be easily determined. The private client in a civil case is
stuck with counsel's "unprofessional errors," however "prejudicial." Malpractice is an option but relitigation is not.
Courts themselves routinely make ex ante determinations of
lawyer competence. Frequently courts appoint the public defender or let the contracts for indigent defense. Judges typically
hire law clerks. The judges do not do their hiring by throwing
darts at the yellow pages. They look to the background and experience of the candidates, and while there is much room for
preferring one lawyer to another, there is also much agreement
on their relative attractiveness.
The ex ante parity standard is thus not concerned with
equality or with the appearance of equality (although the latter
value at least would be served by the test proposed). Rather, the
ex ante parity standard derives from Gideon's postulate that a fair
trial without effective counsel is unlikely at best. The adversary
system can be a mighty engine for the discovery of the truth, but
only if the litigation capability of the adversaries, independent
of the merits of their respective cases, is more-or-less evenly
matched.
On a pretrial motion alleging that the defense function is
not in parity with the prosecution, the court should consider:
(a) whether defense counsel's credentials and experience would
enable defense counsel to compete for a post in the prosecutor's office with responsibilities for prosecuting charges similar
in severity and complexity to those against the accused; (b)
whether defense counsel is compensated at a level comparable
'a' Id. at 548.
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to the compensation paid to a lawyer of comparable seniority in
the prosecution's office; and (c) whether defense counsel's current caseload permits defense counsel to defend the case as vigorously as it will be prosecuted, given the investigative resources
and support staff available. Several points about the proposed
test deserve further explanation.
First, the test does not require absolute equality between the
lawyers representing the two sides in the instant case. Instead it
requires only rough equality between the defense lawyer in the
instant case and the lawyers who typically represent the prosecution in similar cases. The test describes rough equality in terms
of employability: not whether defense counsel would be instantly hired by the prosecution, but only whether defense
counsel could compete for a post comparable to the prosecutor's. Obviously many subjective factors enter into employment
decisions. Just as obviously, there is a floor below which each
law office, public or private, will not go. If defense counsel
could not get an interview in the prosecutor's office, the imbalance is sufficient to doubt the fairness of the pending proceedings.
One obvious proxy for the quality of counsel is the compensation counsel commands. When the public defender not only
puts up with the opprobrium attached to the work, but makes
markedly less money than her counterpart in the state's attorney's office, it is logical to infer that the state can attract and retain better lawyers than the public defender's office. While an
inquiry into compensation would be more complex in contract
or appointment systems, it would nonetheless be a relatively easy
inquiry. It should be possible to determine whether defense
counsel can expect to earn less per hour than the prosecutor.
Even if the lawyers representing the two sides are roughly
comparable in the abstract, their respective responsibilities and
resources may render the contest decisively uneven. There can
be no easy formula for balancing the litigation burden of prosecuting and defending criminal cases. For example, it might
seem that because the prosecutor can rely on the police to investigate, the prosecution has an enormous advantage. But in
many jurisdictions the relations between prosecutors and police
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officers do not exactly fall into the master/servant category.
Nor do the police always focus on the facts that the prosecutor
later realizes are crucial to the success of the case.
Likewise, it might seem that the investigative burden on the
defense is reduced by access to the defendant's personal knowledge. Yet the defendant is often an uncooperative or unreliable
source of information. Moreover, in the case that is of central
concern to the defense function-the innocent defendant mistakenly identified or deliberately framed-the defendant cannot supply any information about the offense.
The prosecution, of course, must prove every element of
every count, while the defense need only raise reasonable doubt
about one element to defeat a charge. This formal difference is
again less important in practice than it looks. Modem notice
provisions and common sense will often point to the obvious defense-consent in a rape case, say, or alibi plus mistaken identity. Moreover, while the prosecutor's obligation to prove every
element beyond a reasonable doubt requires preparing to examine more witnesses at trial, most of the burden of litigation is
borne before trial. Most cases, of course, do not go to trial.
The number of files per attorney is not the whole story of
caseload pressures. Given computers, investigators, paralegals,
and interns, a defender's office might be able to extend the
number of cases each attorney can undertake. These support
services, however, are typically the weakest link in the defense
operation, for while Gideon demands that every defendant have
a lawyer, it does not demand that every lawyer have a laptop
computer, a research assistant, or an investigator.
The proposed parity standard would go a long way toward
clarifying the inquiry into caseload effectiveness. The real question is not whether extreme caseloads can preclude effective assistance. The real question is how to determine when a given
caseload has reached the extreme. The parity standard provides
a rational benchmark: is the workload for defense counsel
roughly comparable to the workload for the prosecution?
Once made, a ruling on defense counsel's parity with the
prosecution need not require detailed inquiry in future cases. If
the individual lawyer is guilty of mis- or mal-feasance; or if the
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caseload increases dramatically; or if the prosecution is improved with the injection of fresh resources, it may be necessary
to reconsider counsel's effectiveness. For the most part, however, it is an inquiry that would need to be made only at fairly
extended intervals-say, every other year.
In a civil challenge to the system of indigent defense, the
application of the ex ante standard obviously could not focus, as
it might on a pretrial motion brought by an individual criminal
defendant, on the balance of litigation capacity between the
parties in a single case. The standard, however, could be easily
modified to account for the difference in procedural contexts.
The basic variables remain the credentials and experience of
the lawyers representing the two sides, their compensation, and
their respective caseloads in light of the available support services. In the civil context, these questions would be asked about
typical indigent defenders as compared to typical prosecutors,
rather than about the defender and the prosecutor in a given
case.
How would the ex ante parity standard address the underlying causes of the crisis in indigent defense? With respect to the
public choice problem, the standard would achieve two important changes. First, by shifting the constitutional inquiry away
from Stricklands case-by-case focus on error correction to a systemic analysis of indicators of legal effectiveness, the proposed
approach would enlarge the role of courts relative to legislatures in determining the resources available for indigent defense. This change implements the representation-reinforcing
model of judicial review. Yet the parity standard would not involve courts in the dubious project of attempting to compel legislative appropriations byjudicial fiat.
The parity standard does not require legislatures to supply
any given level of support for indigent defense. Under the
standard, legislatures could even cut indigent defense servicesbut they could do so only if they also made comparable reductions in the support of the prosecution. Legislatures could be
tough on crime only if they were equally committed to due process.
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The parity standard would not only bring about greater judicial involvement in determining the level of support for indigent defense. The second important change would be to enlist
the prosecution in the struggle for adequate support of the defense function. The parity standard would link the fortunes of
prosecution and defense. Legislatures could not raise the compensation, reduce the workload, or increase the support services
provided to prosecutors without making roughly matching improvements for the defense system. Just as legislatures could
not devote resources to the prosecution without comparable
support for the defense, prosecutors could not seek additional
support for their own offices without seeking parallel support
for the defense function.
What about the horizontal and vertical conflicts?81 The
horizontal conflict among defense counsel's clients derives from
the public choice problem. To the extent that the parity standard initiates progress in securing for indigent defense the required resources, the conflict among clients would decline in
intensity. No doubt it will never disappear; only limitless resources could eliminate it entirely, and those will never be
forthcoming. Nonetheless, most lawyers, prosecutors included,
must make hard choices about how much time to devote on behalf of each case. Real parity between defense and prosecution
would not eliminate the need for such choices, but even clients
relegated to low priority would receive meaningful representation.
The vertical conflict, too, can hardly be eliminated. So long
as the public funds indigent defense, the public will be tempted
to punish indigent defenders who are too successful. If the judiciary, however, were to adopt the parity standard, it would be
more difficult for legislatures to pressure indigent defenders.
The defense budget could be cut only with corresponding reductions in the prosecution's budget. A constitutional standard
for the general level of support required for indigent defense
would secure a measure of independence for indigent defense
lawyers.

Ill

See supratext accompanying notes 37-40.

298

DONALD A. DRTPPS

[Vol. 88

The judicial commitment to effective assistance of counsel

has faltered when confronted with legislative neglect of the defense function. Judges have been quite right to steer clear of attempts to compel appropriations. But the legitimate reluctance
to try to force an elected coordinate branch of the government
to exercise its fiscal prerogative has bred a false sense of despair
about the role of constitutional doctrine in securing an effective
defense. The ex ante parity standard comes to grips with the incentive problems underlying the crisis in indigent defense,
without the troubling specter of an interbranch conflict over
appropriations.
C. IDENTIFYING A PRUDENT REMEDY

The ultimate practical hurdle facing ex ante challenges is
identifying a feasible and prudent remedy.'82 Indeed, one political advantage of an ex ante approach is that, in stark contrast
to Strickland, the bellwether litigation could be brought in juvenile or misdemeanor cases. Judges who might refuse to
threaten the release of murderers and rapists might very well be
willing to threaten the release of drug users, prostitutes, and
shoplifters. Once the basic approach is in place, its application
to more serious cases would involve no more than legislative
compliance with an accepted constitutional standard.
If this seems like strong medicine, there is a more direct judicial remedy. Some desperate courts have resorted to out-andout conscription to provide indigent defense. The parity standard comes with a built-in remedy. If lawyers are to be con'82The prison cases here offer a useful illustration. Forced to expand facilities or
release convicts, legislatures somehow find the funds for minimally humane prison
conditions. Once a court ruled that ajurisdiction's indigent defense system fails an ex
ante challenge, the court should continue pending cases until a date certain upon
which the least serious pending cases will be dismissed until caseload pressures permit
compliance with constitutional standards. In the aftermath of both Gideon and
Argersingerv. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires
appointed counsel at trial when incarceration is imposed for misdemeanor offenses),
legislatures anted up the resources to comply with constitutional standards. Nor was
there anything illegitimate about the courts forcing the state to choose between forgoing punishment or providing the resources required for fair trials. An ex ante approach would no more derogate legitimate legislative authority than did Gideon and
Argersinger.
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scripted for criminal litigation, why not conscript those with experience? There is much to be said for integrating the prosecution and indigent defense functions. But even if this approach
were not adopted as a legislative matter, as ajudicial remedy the
transfer of lawyers and support services from the prosecution to
indigent defense has much to recommend.
The legislature would not be compelled to spend any new
money. The lawyers assigned would have extensive local criminal trial experience. Their reassignment from prosecution to
defense would increase the caseload pressures on the prosecution even as it reduces the pressures on the defense. And it
seems fair to say that this remedy would generate strong political pressures for comprehensive reform of the indigent defense
function.
D. THE INTEGRATION OPTION

The prospect of conscripting prosecutors for indigent defense suggests at least one way to comply with the parity standard. Any given jurisdiction could integrate the prosecutorial
and indigent defense functions into a single office with a single
set of personnel policies respecting qualifications, training,
promotion, compensation, and support services. The Army follows this basic approach under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. The Code provides that at a general court-martial, lawyers for both sides must be certified as competent by the Judge
Advocate General of the relevant service.'83 Under Army practice, defense work is done by lawyers assigned to the Trial Defense Service (TDS) after at least six months experience
representing the government in other capacities, including
prosecuting crimes.

4

The Uniform Code also provides for a measure of consumer
sovereignty. A defendant may retain civilian counsel at his own
expense, or have counsel "detailed" (i.e., appointed) at government expense.1 5 The accused, however, may also request

'

See 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1988).

See Diane Knox, MilitayJusticeforAll AM. LAWYER,Jan./Feb. 1993, at 81.
10 U.S.C. §§ 838 (b) (1)-(3) (1988).
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representation by military counsel who is "reasonably available. ,"' 6
The Trial Defense Service and the government thus draw
legal talent from the same pool. The TDS, however, is not accountable either to the commanding officers who screen and
prefer charges or to prosecuting lawyers at levels lower than the
Judge Advocate General. 8 7 TDS lawyers are paid the same as

other lawyers of similar rank and experience. The Uniform
Code forbids representation by counsel who have previously
represented the opposing side in the same case.188
A civilian jurisdiction could borrow much from the military
model. The State's Attorney's Office would simply include a
Criminal Defense Division. The Defense Division either would
recruit long-term employees from the Prosecuting Division, or
lawyers could be rotated at, say, two year intervals between the
two divisions. The former option guarantees the defense more
independence; the latter option avoids the prospect of lawyers
refusing to perform both prosecution and defense functions.
In my view, the most promising integration scheme would
assign a career supervisor to the defense division, just as the
prosecution function should be supervised at the highest level
by a lawyer for the government. Within divisions, evaluations
should be made by supervisory personnel who would not answer
to members of the other division. The trial lawyers, however,
would rotate at fixed intervals between divisions, carrying the
rank and salary they earned in one division over to the next.
Integration of functions would set in motion political forces
that would lead to rough parity between prosecution and defense. If prosecutors know they must serve terms representing
the defense, the conditions of defense representation will be
improved to a level that will enable the prosecutor's office to retain quality lawyers. Integration of functions would guarantee

,86
Id. § 838 (b) (3) (b).
117 On the development of the Trial Defense Service due to concerns for defense
counsel's actual and perceived independence, see John R. Howell, TDS: The Establishment of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, 100 MIL.L. REV. 4 (1983).

' 0 U.S.C. § 827(a) (1988).
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that defense counsel is qualified for ajob in the prosecutor's office and paid on the same scale as the prosecutor.
More generally, experience with representing both sides
would improve the criminal justice system. Prosecutors would
recognize more often that police investigation sometimes focuses on the innocent and sometimes exceeds the bounds of
both decency and the constitution. Defense lawyers would realize more fully that their role as partners in the pursuit of justice
requires the vigorous assertion of the client's legal rights, but
that acquitting the guilty comes with a price. Whatever was lost
in ideological commitment would be more than made up for by
gains in material support and morale. If our system of constitutional rights is extravagant, it is better to have those rights asserted even by the poor, and ultimately modified for rich and
poor alike, than to have one set of constitutional rights for the
well-represented and another set for typical defendants. In the
long run, the recruitment of judges from the ranks of prosecutors suggests yet another mellowing influence that integration
of functions might exert.
The appearance of justice might suffer from the fact that
the lawyer representing the accused today would represent the
government next year. Of course, if the public defender is notably successful, that result often obtains today. Similarly, a notably successful prosecutor is likely enough to take a job in
criminal defense with a private firm. Professional ethics permit
lawyers to shift sides from defense to prosecution, or from
prosecution to private defense work, so long as the lawyer does
not defend a position adverse to a former client "in the same or
a substantially related matter. " "
What is practically unheard of is for a prosecutor to voluntarily take ajob in indigent defense, although such a shift is just
as permissible under the rules of ethics as the shift to the private

19

MODEL RULES oF PRoFEsSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.9(a) (1995).

Of course, differ-

entjurisdictions articulate and apply the ethical principle in different ways. My point
is less that current ethics rules permit integrated provision of prosecution and defense services than that the ethical rules ought to permit reforms that improve the
vigor of the defense function. If a specific dispensation from general ethical obligations be required to permit such reforms, so be it.
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defense bar. If the system addresses the reality of justice, appearances can be counted on to take care of themselves.
E. THE ROLE OF EKPOSTREVIEW AFTER RECOGNITION OF AN EX
ANTE STANDARD

Should Strickland itself survive the adoption of an ex ante
standard? An ex ante standard clearly should not affect the law
applicable to state interference with counsel's performance, 190
or to Sixth Amendment claims based on conflicts of interest.19 1
The Supreme Court has recognized that these situations, in part
because they can be prevented ex ante, call for more intrusive
review ex post.192 Strickland claims, as current law recognizes, are
a different matter.
Nonetheless, it seems impossible to avoid some sort of ex
post scrutiny of counsel's effectiveness. Even good lawyers from
well-funded offices have bad days, caused by everything from a
death in the family to too many drinks the night before. If some
sort of ex post review is available, it is difficult to imagine a more
demanding standard than Strickland.193 No matter how tight the
standard, convicts facing long sentences have every incentive to
raise ex post challenges, so that the cost to finality of litigating
unmeritorious claims cannot be significantly cut back by tinkering with the precise terms of the ex post standard.
Moreover, for good or ill, the Supreme Court has woven the
Strickland standard into the fabric of federal habeas corpus law.
A state prisoner must show cause and prejudice to raise in fed-

190
See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (trial court prohibited consultation between lawyer and defendant during overnight recess); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (counsel required to call defendant as first witness if
defendant was to testify).
"' See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (when actual conflict, not disclosed to
trial court, adversely influences counsel's representation, reversal required without
showing likelihood that result would have been different); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475 (1978) (failure of trial court to make due inquiry upon notice by defense
counsel of conflict requires automatic reversal).
...
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
".
Illustrative is the Second Circuit's conclusion in Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d

149, 153 (2d Cir. 1983), that the outcome of cases never turned on whether counsel's
performance was assessed under a "reasonable competence" or "farce and mockery"
standard.
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eral court a claim not presented to the state courts." But a
Strickland violation ipso facto establishes both cause (counsel's
unprofessional error) and prejudice (for without prejudice
there would be no Stricklandviolation)."' The Supreme Court's
reluctance to recognize other types of "cause" 196 makes retaining

Strickland an important gateway to the federal forum. For death
row inmates, Stricklandmay be a literally vital gateway.
Surely the adequacy of a system of indigent defense does
not dispose of the claim that there was no fair trial because of
counsel's deficiencies (private counsel's negligence can undermine a conviction, too). Just as surely, the adequacy of the system of indigent defense is relevant to the probability that a
claimed case-specific dereliction by defense counsel undermined the validity of the conviction. If a jurisdiction complies
with the appropriate ex ante standard, it should be rewarded
with an even stricter ex post standard. Circumstantial indicia of
effective assistance ex ante should cast an even stronger burden
on convicts seeking relief on grounds of ineffective assistance ex
post.
The Strickland rule compromises the finality of criminal
convictions, without securing effective defense at trial. In effect,
Stricklandjustifies itself; since legal doctrine fails to secure decent representation at trial, it follows that trials should not be
final. 197 This is perverse. Logically, compliance with constitutional standards ex ante ought to raise the bar at the first step of
the Strickland inquiry. This might be done by formalizing the
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
SeeWAYNE LAFAVE &JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.4, at 1215 (1992).

The authors note that "in such cases, petitioners ordinarily will have little incentive
for pursuing the underlying constitutional claim under the Sykes test, rather than
simply seeking relief on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation." Id.
"6 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772 (1991) (counsel's negligent failure to
file timely appeal of denial of state court collateral review petition was not cause under Sykes because Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply in postconviction collateral review proceedings); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)
(counsel's failure to appeal an issue not cause absent unconstitutional ineffective assistance of counsel; negligent failure to file timely appeal of denial of petition for
post-conviction relief in state court not cause under Sykes, no free-standing Sixth
Amendment violation because Sixth Amendment does not apply to collateral attack
proceedings).
17 See supratext accompanying notes 151-59.
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"heavy measure of deference" to counsel's choices into a presumption of competence that can be rebutted only by clear and
convincing evidence. This modest concession to finality interests would do negligible damage to the function of correcting
errors on appeal.
Even in the absence of ineffective assistance doctrine, traditional appellate practice authorizes reviewing courts to order retrials in the unusual case in which the trial court commits plain
error, notwithstanding counsel's failure to complain at trial. If
the error was obvious and prejudicial to the defense, the reviewing court has discretion to correct errors that "seriously affect
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '' 99 When defense counsel is simply ignorant of the defendant's rights, the plain error standard provides as much
protection as the Strickland test.
There is a difference between the deliberate waiver and the
Strickland
unconscious forfeiture of the defendant's rights.'1
theoretically covers the case of counsel's incompetent but deliberate decision to waive a legal entitlement, while the plain-error
doctrine does not. This is an important point, especially given
the importance of cause and prejudice in federal habeas corpus.
But a deliberate waiver will almost always be classed as a "tactical
choice" under Stricklands first prong. Perhaps in a few cases the
record will show that counsel negligently exercised tactical discretion by deliberately waiving a winning claim. Those cases,
however, are needles in the vast haystack of the criminal justice
system.
Far more important to the unjustly accused is competent
advice about genuine tactical choices-whether to testify, what
jurors to strike, above all, how far to carry the investigation of
possible defenses. Current indigent defense systems deny the
majority of criminal defendants the thoughtful and independ-

"a United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). See generally 3A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICEAND PROCEDURE: CRIMNAL § 856 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1996).
'' Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 ("Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right."') (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
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entjudgment of qualified counsel on these crucial questions. If
an ex ante standard contributed even a little to improving the
overall quality of the defense function, it would prevent far
more miscarriages ofjustice than it might leave uncorrected as a
consequence of curtailing ex post review under Strickland. Improving the quality of the defense function generally would also
go a long way toward reducing the number of boneheaded
waivers-the one class of troubling cases reached by Strickland
but not by the plain-error rule.
As fot federal habeas, the theoretical availability of Strickland
claims led the Court to conflate-if not confuse-ineffective assistance as excuse for default in state court and ineffective assistance as a free-standing violation of the Sixth Amendment.2 00 As
a result of Strickland, state law claims can be relitigated in the
guise of ineffective assistance claims. If the state trial judge violated state law in instructing the jury, that claim is not cognizable on federal habeas. But counsel's failure to object or to
appeal the jury instructions is cognizable as a free-standing violation under Strickland. In its zeal to guard the federal forum,
the Court has refused to find counsel's failings as cause for state
defaults unless those failings amount to ineffective assistance
under Strickland. The habeas tail is wagging the Sixth Amendment dog.
Maybe federal habeas review of defaulted claims should be
confined to cases that meet the Strickland test, but if so, it is not
because Strickland provides the current test for Sixth Amendment violations. The contrast between Stone v. Powel °1 and
Kimmelman v. Morrison!12 is instructive.

Maybe Fourth Amend-

ment claims should be heard on federal habeas and maybe not,
but their cognizability should not depend on whether a Fourth
Amendment claim was erroneously denied by a judge or negligently waived by a lawyer. In the default context, Strickland converts state law claims into federal claims, while it furnishes a

See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); C8ARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE:JuRISDICTON § 4266.1 (2d ed. 1988).
21, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
202477 U.S. 365 (1986).
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rhetorical prop to a narrow interpretation of "cause" that keeps
some genuine federal claims out of the federal forum.
Whatever one's views of federal habeas, those views are logically independent of the appropriate standards for effective assistance of counsel.2 3 If, as I suggest, the adoption of an ex ante
standard led to even more restrictive standards for ex post ineffective-assistance challenges on direct appeal, the Court would
have to rethink its reliance on ineffective assistance doctrine in
the habeas cases. How that process might work itself out is the
subject of another article.
VII. CONCLUSION

I have developed several claims about indigent defense, and
thoughtful readers might agree with some but dispute others. I
conclude by enumerating the various claims I have defended.
First, I have made a descriptive claim. Indigent defense in
the United States is chronically undersupported, morally as well
as financially. This claim is not novel; it echoes conventional
wisdom. I have, however, traced the chronic neglect of the defense function to its roots in legislative incentives. The public
choice problem explains why legislatures underfund indigent
defense. The persistent lack of support in turn subjects defense
lawyers to a horizontal conflict among clients manifested in legal triage, and to a vertical conflict with the funding authority
manifesting itself in diffident representation more concerned
with processing caseloads than with resisting authority.
Second, I have made a normative claim. Fair trial, which
depends on effective defense counsel, deserves special priority
over competing uses of public funds. This claim also has found
acceptance in conventional wisdom, but its implications are underappreciated. Anyone who accepts the normative premise of
203 On

a view of habeas as a remedy for the enforcement of federal rights state

courts might neglect, the StonelKimmelman contrast makes the point graphically clear.
On a view of habeas as a procedural safeguard against factual error, the conclusion
still follows that review should not depend on an independent Sixth Amendment violation. Cf Joseph Hoffman & William Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SuP.
Cr. REv. 65, 113 ("If a habeas petitioner can show a reasonable probability that his
conviction was unjust-that he is innocent of the crime charged-we believe it is
wrong to deny him relief solely because his lawyer mistakenly failed to raise a claim.").
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Gideon may not logically object to my proposed parity approach
on the ground that it will cost too much money. It is fair to
question whether the parity approach will, as I hope, set in motion political forces to improve the material resources of indigent defense. It is not fair to accept that positive prediction but
object to the result on grounds of economy. At least, it is not
fair to make that argument without urging the overthrow of
Gideon v. Wainwright.
Third, I have made a doctrinal claim. An ex ante parity
standard would improve on Strickland in .realizing the commitment to fair trials embodied in the due process clauses, the
Sixth Amendment, and in Gideon. Ex post standards test counsel's performance against a record made by counsel, and with
retrial as the only remedy. Ex post approaches thus do little to
improve the performance of the defense function. They nonetheless compromise the important interest in the finality of
criminal proceedings.
My argument against ex post analysis, including performance-based standards, is novel. Even if the parity standard I
support is rejected, courts and scholars who agree with my critique of ex post approaches can make a fresh start by searching
for a more acceptable ex ante standard. For example, guidelines
based on the American Bar Association's Standardsfor Criminal
Justicemight be developed.
The parity standard-which like ex ante analysis is generally
novel-recognizes that fair trial requires rough equality in litigation effectiveness. If adopted by courts as a constitutional standard, the parity approach would operate on the roots of the
indigent defense crisis by giving both legislatures and prosecutors political incentives to upgrade the defense function. The
military system offers one possible model for achieving parity.
Once again, however, even readers who agree with my ex ante
parity standard might reasonably reject the military model in favor of some other approach to achieving parity.
No doubt the precise form of the ex ante standard could be a
subject of much debate. There is, however, broad and deep
agreement on the premises supporting an ex ante approach.
Studies across a generation have documented the failings of in-
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digent defense. Observers spanning the spectrum from Burger
to Bazelon have agreed with the studies. No one believes that
Strickland improves the trial process beyond a few rare cases of
error correction. Everyone agrees that Gideon was rightly decided. Putting these elements together, I see the real potential
to reform the criminal justice system through constitutional
doctrine.

